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ABSTRACT 
This Article reexamines the nexus of relationships among informed 
transactions, information asymmetry, and liquidity of securities markets in 
the context of public policy debates about insider trading and its regula-
tion. The Article analyzes this nexus, with the emphasis on recent empiri-
cal studies and developments in the securities industry, from a variety of 
perspectives and considers the validity of the alleged link between insider 
trading—as opposed to other forms of informed trading—and market 
liquidity as a justification for the existence of regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The nexus of relationships among informed transactions, information 
asymmetry, and liquidity of securities markets is an important part of 
public policy debates about insider trading and its regulation.
1
 The alleged 
harm of insiders’ transactions on superior information to market makers, 
entities that provide liquidity in securities markets,
2
 and, as a result, to 
other traders in the form of lower market liquidity
3
 is frequently cited as 
an economic cost of insider trading
4
 and used to justify regulation.
5
 The 
                                                 
1 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 passim (2004) 
[hereinafter Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread]; Stanislav Dolgopo-
lov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity in Complex Securities: The Impact of Insid-
er Trading on Options Market Makers, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 387 passim 
(2010) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity]. 
2 The boundaries of the term “market maker” are blurry and go beyond market partic-
ipants designated, or recognized as such, by trading venues and specialized over-the-
counter dealers. See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act 
Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter SEC’s Concept 
Release on Equity Market Structure] (“The use of certain strategies by some proprietary 
firms [engaging in high-frequency trading] has, in many trading centers, largely replaced 
the role of specialists and market makers with affirmative and negative obligations.”); 
John Cassidy, Hedge Clipping, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 28, 33 (“Basically, [sever-
al top-performing hedge funds] are the largest market-making firms in the world .... 
[engaged] in sucking up tick-by-tick data, processing all those data, and converting them 
into second-by-second positions in thousands of spreads worldwide. It’s just algorithmic 
market-making.”) (quoting Harry Kat, Professor of Risk Management, City University 
London). 
3 The original argument about the adverse impact of informed trading, including in-
sider trading, on market liquidity caused by an additional cost to market makers was 
made in Walter Bagehot [Jack L. Treynor], The Only Game in Town, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Mar.–Apr. 1971, at 12, 13–14. However, a much earlier source made the diametrically 
opposite argument: such transactions should decrease bid-ask spreads by creating addi-
tional market activity. F. LAVINGTON, THE ENGLISH CAPITAL MARKET 248, 260 (1921). 
4 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 105; see 
also Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate 
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 62 
(2006) [hereinafter Illegal Insider Trading Hearings] (prepared testimony of John C. 
Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) (“As in-
formed traders increase their trading upon asymmetric information, bid/asked spreads are 
likely to widen on all stocks .... [Hence,] insider trading causes the cost of equity capital 
to rise, and this in turn has a macro-economic effect on GNP, employment, and the econ-
omy as a whole.”); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violation When 
Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 312–13 (“Since market makers and 
specialists have difficulty knowing whether they are dealing with ... inside-information-
informed traders or with uninformed outsiders, they cover the expected costs of being on 
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analysis of the alleged link between informed trading and different dimen-
sions of market liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads and market depths, has 
produced an avalanche of empirical studies, such as efforts to quantify the 
“adverse selection” component of bid-ask spreads and analysis of event 
and cross-country data,
6
 and even experimental research.
7
 These studies 
have examined a variety of trading venues, notably the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), NASDAQ, 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (HKSE). On the other hand, the line between insider trading and 
other forms of informed trading in these studies was frequently blurry. 
                                                                                                                         
the other side of trades with informed traders through the bid/ask spread they offer all 
traders.”); M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 
512 (2011) (“Specialists making markets in a firm’s stock in which insiders might be 
trading will increase the bid-ask spread to compensate for the risk that they are trading at 
an informational disadvantage, and this will reduce liquidity and raise the firm’s cost of 
capital.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities 
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 589 (2005) (“[I]nsider trading 
increase[s] the transaction costs of trading to specialists, market makers, and investors by 
widening the bid-ask spread ....”). 
5 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 90 & 
nn.35–36, 106–07 & nn.112–15; see also Illegal Insider Trading Hearings, supra note 4, 
at 95 (prepared testimony of Jonathan Macey, Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, 
Yale University) (arguing that “insider trading increases the transaction costs of invest-
ing; particularly by increasing the bid-asked spreads .... [which is one of the reasons why] 
regulation of insider trading protects investors and, in doing so, encourages the develop-
ment of high quality capital markets”); Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and 
Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and 
Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 261–62 (2007) (viewing the alleged harm im-
posed on market makers by insider trading as a potential explanation for the correlation 
between more stringent insider trading regulation and greater market liquidity); Aaron 
Gilbert et al., Insiders and the Law: The Impact of Regulatory Change on Insider Trad-
ing, 47 MGMT. INT’L REV. 745, 763 (2007) (arguing that insider trading regulation leads 
to “a significant reduction of the microstructure effects of insider trading [including lower 
bid-ask spreads]” and stressing “the positive economic spin-offs a healthy financial 
market brings”). 
6 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, passim; 
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, passim. 
7 See Robert Bloomfield, Quotes, Prices, and Estimates in a Laboratory Market, 51 J. 
FIN. 1791, 1806 (1996); Jan Pieter Krahnen & Martin Weber, Marketmaking in the La-
boratory: Does Competition Matter?, 4 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 55, 80–81 (2001); Charles 
R. Schnitzlein, Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms Under Asymmetric Informa-
tion: An Experimental Investigation, 51 J. FIN. 613, 614 (1996); Andreas Oehler et al., 
Do Insiders Contribute to Market Efficiency? Informational Efficiency and Liquidity of 
Experimental Call Markets with and Without Insiders 15 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author), available at http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/22490 
/1/bafifo11.pdf. 
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Insiders’ transactions on superior information can take forms other 
than purchases and sales of equity securities. Numerous empirical studies 
suggest the existence of informed trading, a significant portion of which 
probably consists of insider trading, in the form of equity short selling
8
 
and transactions in equity options, debt instruments, single stock futures, 
and credit default swaps.
9
 Overall, there is little evidence that insider trad-
ing has posed a significant concern for equity market makers,
10
 apart from 
occasional references that these market participants may want to identify 
specific orders based on inside information in order to engage in price 
                                                 
8 See Ronald Anderson et al., Family Controlled Firms and Informed Trading: Evi-
dence from Short Sales, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 30–32) (on file with author), 
available at http://www.afajof.org/afa/forthcoming/7865.pdf; Ekkehart Boehmer et al., 
Which Shorts Are Informed?, 63 J. FIN. 491, 524–25 (2008); Stephen E. Christophe et al., 
Short-Selling Prior to Earnings Announcements, 59 J. FIN. 1845, 1873–74 (2004); He-
mang Desai et al., An Investigation of the Informational Role of Short Interest in the 
Nasdaq Market, 52 J. FIN. 2263, 2286 (2002); Bidisha Chakrabarty & Andriy Shkilko, 
Information Leakages in Financial Markets: Evidence from Shorting Around Insider 
Sales 27–28 (Mar. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083795. 
9 See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, More Insiders, More Insider Trading: 
Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 500 (2010) (credit default 
swaps, debt instruments, and equity options); Turan G. Bali & Armen Hovakimian, 
Volatility Spreads and Expected Stock Returns, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1797, 1811 (2009) (equity 
options); Charles Cao et al., The Information Content of Option-Implied Volatility for 
Credit Default Swap Valuation, 13 J. FIN. MKTS. 321, 339–40 (2010) (credit default 
swaps and equity options); Melanie Cao & Jason Wei, Option Market Liquidity: Commo-
nality and Other Characteristics, 13 J. FIN. MKTS. 20, 46 (2010) (equity options); Charles 
Collver, Measuring the Impact of Option Market Activity on the Stock Market: Bivariate 
Point Process Models of Stock and Option Transactions, 12 J. FIN. MKTS. 87, 103–04 
(2009) (equity options); Martijn Cremers & David Weinbaum, Deviations from Put-Call 
Parity and Stock Return Predictability, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 335, 337–
38 (2010) (equity options); Bartley R. Danielsen et al., Single Stock Futures as a Substi-
tute for Short Sales: Evidence from Microstructure Data, 36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1273, 
1291 (2009) (single stock futures); Richard Roll et al., O/S: The Relative Trading Activity 
in Options and Stock, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 2, 16 (2010) (equity options); Kildeep Shastri et 
al., Information Revelation in the Futures Market: Evidence from Single Stock Futures, 
28 J. FUTURES MKTS. 335, 347 (2008) (single stock futures); Andrew Ang et al., The 
Joint Cross Section of Stocks and Options 39–40 (Nov. 16, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533089 (equity op-
tions); Lars Norden, Credit Derivatives, Corporate News, and Credit Ratings 28–29 (Oct. 
18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www 
.bundesbank.de/download/vfz/konferenzen/20081211_ffm/paper_norden.pdf (credit de-
fault swaps); Xing Zhou, Information-Based Trading in the Junk Bond Market 22–24 
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.cis.upenn 
.edu/~mkearns/finread/junk_bond.pdf (debt instruments and equity options). 
10 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, passim. 
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discrimination—for instance, via non-firm quotes—or to follow the lead.
11
 
Analogously, there are only a few episodes documenting real harm to 
equity market makers from insider trading, which, nevertheless, do not 
clearly indicate the existence of a consistent practice of widening bid-ask 
spreads for all trades in response to insider trading.
12
 On the other hand, 
this type of harm is evident from the position taken by options market 
makers and the options industry.
13
 These observations raise the question 
about the nature of harm imposed by insider trading on market makers, 
and the magnitude of the social cost caused by lower liquidity of equity 
markets
14
 or derivatives markets.
15
 Another important consideration is the 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Bernard Attard, Making a Market. Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange, 
1800–1986, 7 FIN. HIST. REV. 5, 18 (2000) (quoting an unnamed equity market maker on 
his likely responses to suspected insider trading by a specific customer). 
12 See, e.g., RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 358 
(1999) (describing an incident in 1949 when equity market makers were harmed by 
transactions of insiders affiliated with dog race track companies based on information 
obtained from a government official that “the wartime ban on mid-week dog racing was 
to be relaxed”). 
13 See Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, passim. 
14 Although the link between greater liquidity of equity markets and increased firm 
value is not entirely uncontroversial, there are several asset pricing and corporate gover-
nance-related rationales for this relationship. See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the 
Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 100–02 & nn.99–106; see also Yakov Amihud & Haim 
Mendelson, Liquidity, the Value of the Firm, and Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. 
FIN., Spring 2008, at 32; Vivian W. Fang et al., Stock Market Liquidity and Firm Value, 
94 J. FIN. ECON. 150 (2009). 
15 A comprehensive survey of empirical studies of the impact of derivatives on mar-
kets in underlying assets, including evidence pertaining to equity options, suggested that 
“the introduction of derivatives does not destabilize the underlying market .... [and] tends 
to improve the liquidity and informativeness of markets.” Stewart Mayhew, The Impact 
of Derivatives on Cash Markets: What Have We Learned?, at i (Feb. 3, 2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://media.terry.uga.edu/docu 
ments/finance/impact.pdf. The theoretical underpinning is that derivatives can “com-
plete” the market in question, pushing it closer to Pareto efficiency, and improve price 
discovery by processing additional information. See Richard Roll et al., Options Trading 
Activity and Firm Valuation, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 345, 345–46 (2009); Stephen A. Ross, 
Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75 passim (1976); Mark Rubenstein, An Economic 
Evaluation of Organized Options Markets, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 49, 52–53, 
56–57 (1979). For more direct empirical evidence suggesting that active options markets 
increase firm value, see Roll et al., supra, at 349. Compare Ramesh P. Rao & Christopher 
K. Ma, The Effect of Call-Option-Listing Announcement on Shareholder Wealth, 15 J. 
BUS. RES. 449, 461 (1987) (documenting negative excess equity returns associated with 
announcements of the introduction of exchange-traded standardized options and positive 
excess equity returns associated with the commencement of trading of such options and 
arguing that this phenomenon is attributed to the expectation that such instruments would 
destabilize equity trading in the future and additional demand stimulated by additional 
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extent to which this social cost can be effectively controlled via regulatory 
means. 
This Article reexamines, with the emphasis on recent empirical studies 
and developments in the securities industry, the nexus of relationships 
among informed transactions, information asymmetry, and liquidity of 
securities markets in the context of public policy debates about insider 
trading and its regulation. The topics covered are: (1) the nature of market 
makers’ losses from insider trading and the significance of inventory man-
agement in various markets; (2) the distinction between insider trading and 
other forms of informed trading; (3) the importance of disentangling in-
formed trading, informational asymmetry, and uncertainty; (4) bid-ask 
spread decomposition studies; (5) the connection among estimates of the 
probability of informed trading and bid-ask spreads and their components; 
(6) various mechanisms for providing liquidity; (7) the examination of 
unregulated securities markets and the impact of insider trading regulation 
on market liquidity; and (8) the significance of firm characteristics. The 
Article concludes by examining the alleged link between insider trading 
and market liquidity as a justification for the existence of regulation based 
on the weight of empirical evidence, stressing the importance of the dis-
tinction between insider trading and other types of informed trading, and 
suggesting directions for future empirical research. 
I. THE NATURE OF MARKET MAKERS’ LOSSES FROM INSIDER TRADING 
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT IN VARIOUS 
MARKETS 
The idea that market makers are harmed by insider trading—or in-
formed trading more generally—has an intuitive appeal: 
                                                                                                                         
risk-return combinations), with Bartley R. Danielsen & Sorin M. Sorescu, Why Do Op-
tion Introductions Depress Stock Prices? A Study of Diminishing Short Sale Constrains, 
36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 451, 451 (2001) (documenting negative excess 
equity returns associated with the commencement of trading of exchange-traded standar-
dized options and explaining this phenomenon by the mitigation of constraints on short 
selling), and with Stewart Mayhew & Vassil Mihov, Short Sale Constraints, Overvalua-
tion, and the Introduction of Options 21 (Oct. 7, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=544245 (finding that the commence-
ment of trading of exchange-traded standardized options does not produce negative 
excess equity returns). But see Bartley R. Danielsen et al., Reassessing the Impact of 
Option Introductions on Market Quality: A Less Restrictive Test for Event-Date Effects, 
42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1041, 1061 (2007) (arguing that “previous studies 
have misinterpreted ex ante changes as option introduction effects” and “[i]n most cases, 
market quality, as measured by spreads, trading volume, and volatility, peaks before the 
option listing date”). 
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In many markets, any insider always trades directly with a market mak-
er—or at least preempts him from making a favorable trade—because 
the latter, as a marginal trader, absorbs with his capital all immediate 
order imbalances, and this argument appears to demonstrate the exis-
tence of actual losses inflicted on market makers.16 
It follows that insider trading may be harmful to such dimensions of 
market liquidity as bid-ask spreads, as a proxy for compensation to a mar-
ket maker for providing liquidity,
17
 and market depths, as a proxy for the 
extent of liquidity offered by a market maker.
18
 
On the other hand, market makers do not passively absorb order im-
balances; instead, they actively manage their inventories and target some 
preferred inventory level in equity markets
19
 or some market-neutral posi-
                                                 
16 Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 395. 
17 Some trading venues also allow market makers to collect special rebates for ex-
ecuted transactions by posting “passive” orders—typically at the expense of access fees 
borne by traders submitting “aggressive” orders—and such rebates in this pricing model, 
which is known as “maker-taker” or “make-or-take,” serve as another method of com-
pensating market makers for providing liquidity in addition to profits from bid-ask 
spreads. See SEC’s Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 2, at 3598–
99, 3608; MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 57–58 (2010). 
18 See Dominique Dupont, Market Making, Prices, and Quantity Limits, 13 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1129, 1130 (2000) (a formal model finding that “the theoretical dealer adjusts the 
depth proportionally more than the bid-ask spread in response to changes in the degree of 
informational asymmetry” caused by the presence of informed trading). 
19 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 110–16 
& nn.123–58; Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 395 
& n.24, 400 & n.41. For general sources on inventory management by equity market 
makers, see M.F.M. OSBORNE, THE STOCK MARKET FROM A PHYSICIST’S POINT OF VIEW 
48–51 (1977); Pamela C. Moulton, Inventory Effects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 976 passim (Rama Cont ed., 2010). For empirical evidence on 
equity market markets’ inventory management, see Carole Camerton-Forde et al., Time 
Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market-Maker Inventories and Revenues, 65 J. FIN. 
295, 325–26 (2010) (evidence from the NYSE); Oliver Hansch, The Cross-Sectional 
Determinants of Inventory Control and the Subtle Effects of ADRs, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 
1915, 1931 (2004) (evidence from the LSE); Terrence Hendershott & Mark S. Seasholes, 
Market Maker Inventories and Stock Prices, 97 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 210, 
214 (2007) (evidence from the NYSE); Bülent Köksal, Participation Strategy of the 
NYSE Specialists to the Posted Quotes, 21 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 314, 329–30 (2010) 
(evidence from the NYSE); Narayan Y. Naik & Pradeep K. Yadav, Do Dealer Firms 
Manage Inventory on a Stock-by-Stock or a Portfolio Basis?, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 349–
50 (2003) (evidence from the LSE); Sigridur Benediktsdottir, An Empirical Analysis of 
Specialist Trading Behavior at the New York Stock Exchange 3–4 (Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 876, 2006), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2006/876/ifdp876.pdf (evidence from the NYSE). 
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tion in options markets
20
—and hence control their risk exposure to price 
movements.
21
 Furthermore, informed trading does not necessarily create 
order imbalances
22
 or push a market maker away from his preferred level 
of risk exposure.
23
 More generally, the impact of informed trading on 
market makers is ambiguous because intervening inventory management-
related transactions may take place during the time gap between the in-
formed transaction in question and the recognition of this piece of infor-
mation by the market.
24
 Of course, the maximum harm is inflicted when 
the relevant piece of information, holding its price impact constant, is 
immediately disclosed to, or otherwise absorbed by, the market. It follows 
that market makers are likely to be significantly harmed by trading on 
short-lived information because of various complications with offsetting 
such transactions and inferring their information content. However, this 
scenario does not necessarily characterize true insider trading on the basis 
of “soft” or “hard” information, as it often takes place days or weeks—if 
not longer—in advance. 
The magnitude of the harm inflicted by informed trading largely de-
pends on the ease of inventory management—and hence market liquidi-
ty—and insider trading in particular is of real concern for specific types of 
market makers.
25
 One category consists of market makers of equity 
blocks, as this market is inherently less liquid, although it is also less ano-
nymous and more reliant on reputation.
26
 Another category represents 
options market makers because they “trade multiple options with different 
                                                 
20 See Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 403–07 
& nn.53–74. 
21 One key factor is that risk exposure of market makers may be magnified in several 
instances. For options market makers, this situation may arise because of the leveraged 
nature and other attributes of the risk profile of options. See id. at 399, 408–09. Another 
consideration is that an equity market maker may short sell shares of stock that he does 
not own. See DURBIN, supra note 17, at 56. In this case, the exposure of this market 
participant is also magnified—with a theoretical possibility of unlimited losses. For the 
recent regulatory restrictions on short selling activities of both equity and options market 
makers, see Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 11,232 (Feb. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
22 Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 111. 
23 Id. at 113. 
24 Id. at 110–11. 
25 Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, passim. 
26 See id. at 396 & n.26; see also Hendrik Bessembinder & Kumar Venkataraman, 
Does an Electronic Stock Exchange Need an Upstairs Market?, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 31–32 
(2004) (examining block trades on the Paris Bourse intermediated by upstairs brokers, 
which can act as either agents or principals, and arguing that these market participants 
certify certain orders as uninformed). 
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expiration dates and strike prices, which are less liquid and more leve-
raged than underlying securities, face limitations of dynamic and static 
hedging of options as nonlinear derivatives, and assume additional risk by 
creating options instead of trading from their inventories.”
27
 As one ex-
ecutive of a leading options market making firm has noted, “[i]n some 
markets, insider trading is so bad that we have given up making markets 
for options on smaller stocks altogether.”
28
 
The countervailing force for market makers is the potential value of 
observing order flow to infer informed trading ahead of the market.
29
 As 
an illustration, one study concluded that, “[o]nce [informed] traders have 
been identified ... the market maker [on the Boston Options Exchange 
enters into] ... a subsequent trade in the same option and adopts positions 
that follow the informed trader.”
30
 This advantage, probably largely 
eroded in many markets because of recent technological and institutional 
changes,
31
 depends on the percentage of total order flow observed by the 
market maker in question and transparency of transactions in real time to 
other market participants.
32
 There is some empirical evidence that certain 
types of market makers are informed traders as proxied by their profits 
from position-taking, in addition to their gains from providing liquidity via 
realized bid-ask spreads.
33
 Since many of these examples come from mar-
                                                 
27 Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 408. For a 
recent study that provides empirical evidence that informed trading has a clear effect on 
liquidity of options markets in contrast to equity markets, see Cao & Wei, supra note 9, 
at 45–46. 
28 Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Interactive Brokers Grp., 
Speech Before the International Options Market Association 3 (Apr. 12, 2005), http:// 
www.interactivebrokers.com/en/general/about/commentLetters/IOA_Speech.pdf. 
29 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 116 & 
nn.159–62. 
30 Nabil Khoury et al., PIP Transactions, Price Improvement, Informed Trades and 
Order Execution, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 211, 226 (2010). 
31 See, e.g., Letter from Greg Tusar, Managing Dir., Goldman Sachs Clearing & Ex-
ecution, L.P. & Matthew Lavicka, Managing Dir., Goldman, Sachs & Co., to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (June 25, 2010), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-243.pdf (“[C]hanges in the business models of 
many exchanges and advancements in technology have eliminated or reduced the value 
of the special time and place privileges traditionally enjoyed by specialists and registered 
market makers ....”). 
32 Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 116–18 & 
nn.162–69. 
33 See Amber Anand & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Information and the Intermediary: 
Are Market Intermediaries Informed Traders in Electronic Markets?, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 26–27 (2008) (evidence from equity trading on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange); Michael F. Ferguson & Steven C. Mann, Execution Costs and Their 
 
2012] INSIDER TRADING, INFORMED TRADING 11 
 
kets other than equities and equity options, it is likely that such trading 
profits largely arise from the exploitation of informational advantages that 
are not based on observing true insiders’ transactions.
34
 Some empirical 
evidence even indicates that certain market makers do not gain or lose 
money on position-taking,
35
 but these seemingly contradictory results may 
be explained by institutional and regulatory differences, such as affirma-
tive and negative obligations of market makers.
36
 
There is some empirical evidence that market makers profit from ob-
serving insiders’ transactions. For instance, one study analyzed registered 
                                                                                                                         
Intraday Variation in Futures Markets, 74 J. BUS. 125, 157 (2001) (evidence from for-
eign currency, interest rate, and commodity futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange); Alex Frino et al., Local Trader Profitability in Futures Markets: Liquidity 
and Position Taking Profits, 30 J. FUTURES MKTS. 1, 17 (2010) (evidence from interest 
rate, government securities, and equity index futures trading on the Sydney Futures 
Exchange); Alexander Kurov & Dennis J. Lasser, Price Dynamics in the Regular and E-
Mini Futures Markets, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 365, 381–82 (2004) (evi-
dence from equity index futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange); Bene-
diktsdottir, supra note 19, at 3–4 (evidence from equity trading on the NYSE); Michel 
van der Wel et al., Are Market Makers Uninformed and Passive? Signing Trades in the 
Absence of Quotes 20–21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 395, 2009), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr395.html (evidence 
from government securities futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade). 
34 In the recent past, the issue of potential abuses of informational advantages effec-
tively conferred by the NYSE’s trading architecture on its market makers—then called 
“specialists”—was quite controversial. See, e.g., Market Structure III: The Role of the 
Specialist in the Evolving Modern Marketplace: Field Hearing Before the Subcom. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th 
Cong. 56 (2004) (prepared statement of Robert Greenfield, President and Chief Executive 
Officer, NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.) (arguing that the practice of “‘stepping ahead’ of 
customer orders and a host of other occurrences with equally disturbing names like ‘pen-
ny-jumping,’ ‘holding up cancel requests,’ and ‘matching the public’ .... [were caused by 
the specialists’ exclusive access to] non-public material information about the trading 
characteristics of their assigned stock”). Ultimately, the NYSE eliminated the “advance 
‘look’ at incoming orders,” which was previously available to specialists, for their suc-
cessors, “designated market makers.” Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change To 
Create a New NYSE Market Model, Exchange Act Release No. 58,845, 73 Fed. Reg. 
64,379, 64,389 (Oct. 24, 2008). 
35 See Joel Hasbrouck & George Sofianos, The Trades of Market Makers: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of NYSE Specialists, 48 J. FIN. 1565, 1588 (1993) (evidence from equity 
trading on the NYSE); Oliver Hansch et al., Preferencing, Internalization, Best Execu-
tion, and Dealer Profits, 54 J. FIN. 1799, 1801–02 (1999) (evidence from equity trading 
on the LSE); Michaël Dewally et al., Determinants of Trading Profits of Individual Trad-
ers: Risk Premia or Information 31 (Mar. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535543 (evidence from energy futures 
trading on NYMEX). 
36 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 118. 
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transactions by insiders on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ from 
1988 to 2002, when such transactions were reported with a significant 
delay, and suggested that equity market makers were able to identify in-
formation-based orders and execute them at adjusted prices.
37
 Further-
more, the study asserted that “[m]arket makers do not front-run informed 
trades before the trade. However, with the large initial stock price adjust-
ment, the market maker shares into the insider profits.”
38
 A companion 
study of insiders’ registered transactions from the same time period and 
trading venues found that market makers’ quote revisions are greater for 
insiders’ purchases compared to other purchases, and it also pointed to 
“[t]he piggy-backing of market makers on insider trades.”
39
 Another re-
lated study concluded that equity market makers on the NYSE and the 
AMEX increase price sensitivity before both scheduled and unscheduled 
corporate announcements, “suggest[ing] that market makers are able to 
extract and react to information related to timing.”
40
 In any instance, the 
analysis of the overall impact of insider trading on market makers must 
take into account both potential costs and benefits of this practice. 
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSIDER TRADING AND OTHER FORMS 
OF INFORMED TRADING 
In the context of the link between insider trading and market liquidity, 
it is critical to make the distinction between true insider trading and other 
forms of informed trading, despite the blurry economic and legal bounda-
ries of these types of transactions. The gamut of informational advantages 
in securities markets is rather broad, with different types of company-
specific, including security-specific, and non-company-specific informa-
tion that may be inherently concentrated or dispersed among different 
                                                 
37 A. Can Inci & H. Nejat Seyhun, How Do Quotes and Prices Evolve Around Iso-
lated Informed Trades?, J. ECON. & FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4, 6, 20) (on file 
with author). 
38 Id. (manuscript at 3). 
39 A. Can Inci et al., Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and Trades Around Insider 
Trading, FIN. MGMT., Spring 2010, at 323, 341. 
40 Joon Chae, Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and Timing Information, 60 
J. FIN. 413, 415 (2005). Another contribution concluded that bid-ask spreads for stocks 
on the NYSE do not change before unanticipated announcements, as opposed to antic-
ipated announcements, and argued that, “[b]efore unanticipated events, if there is in-
formed trading, the market maker either does not recognize it or does not react to it.” 
John R. Graham et al., Information Flow and Liquidity Around Anticipated and Unanti-
cipated Dividend Announcements, 79 J. BUS. 2301, 2302–03 (2006). However, an alter-
native interpretation is that informed trading provides market makers with valuable 
information about future price moves—not just signals about increased volatility. 
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market participants. Such advantages may stem from the possession of 
pieces of information that originate inside the company whose securities 
are being traded—or even another company, such as a potential acquirer—
or may be based on macroeconomic, industry-wide, and other similar 
outside factors.
41
 Informed trading may also be based on the quickness of 
reaction to public information.
42
 In addition, market participants’ “knowl-
edge of their own inventory and customer order flow may convey infor-
mation about fundamentals, short-term price fluctuations, or customer 
demand.”
43
 
Overall, market makers are likely to be seriously disadvantaged “by 
trading on short-lived information stemming from non-instantaneous dis-
semination of public announcements, advance knowledge of certain trad-
ing trends or incoming orders, or certain advantages in acquiring, process-
ing, and aggregating public information.”
44
 One example of a market par-
                                                 
41 For empirical studies discussing informed trading and price discovery in markets 
for basket- and index-based securities, see Rafiqul Bhuyan et al., LEAPS of Faith: A 
Trading Indicator Based on CBOE S&P 500 LEAPS Option Open Interest Information, J. 
INVESTING, Summer 2010, at 85; Kam C. Chan et al., Do Options Contribute to Price 
Discovery in Emerging Markets?, 1 INT’L REV. ACCT. BANKING & FIN. 92 (2009); Jeff 
Fleming et al., Trading Costs and Relative Rates of Price Discovery in Stock, Futures, 
and Option Markets, 16 J. FUTURES MKTS. 353 (1996). 
42 See, e.g., Hee-Joon Ahn et al., Informed Trading in the Index Option Market: The 
Case of KOSPI 200 Options, 28 J. FUTURES MKTS. 1118, 1121 (2008) (arguing that 
“sophisticated investors [can] capitalize on their superior information-processing skills 
and/or their superior trading skills .... [resulting in] information-motivated trading based 
on public information”); Pierluigi Balduzzi et al., Economic News and Bond Prices: 
Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Market, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 523, 539 
(2001) (arguing that “asymmetry arises not because different information is received by 
traders, but because traders may have differing ability to process the information”); T. 
Clifton Green, Economic News and the Impact of Trading on Bond Prices, 59 J. FIN. 
1201, 1202 (2004) (arguing that “the release of public information raises the level of 
information asymmetry .... [because] some market participants have an advantage at 
determining [the impact of] macro news”); see also Ryan Riordan et al., Public Informa-
tion Arrival: Price Discovery and Liquidity in Electronic Limit Order Markets 2 (Apr. 4, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/ab 
stract=1620425 (“Most news is still read by humans but news providers have started to 
offer newswire products with machine-learning systems that specifically cater to algo-
rithmic traders.”). 
43 Roger D. Huang et al., Information-Based Trading in the Treasury Note Interdealer 
Broker Market, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 269, 270 (2002). 
44 Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 397; see al-
so Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the 
Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 140 (1988) (“Perhaps information from which 
market-makers must protect themselves is related to superior analytical ability among 
some investors rather than information obtained by legally defined insiders.”); Oliver 
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ticipant in today’s high-speed securities markets, whose presence may 
harm a market maker, is “a quantitative trader ... who performs bleeding-
edge statistical analysis on screaming-fast computing hardware .... [to] 
make reasonably confident predictions based on very strong alpha signals, 
thereby seeing something in the markets that others do not, or at least 
before they do.”
45
 Market makers may even be disadvantaged by short-
term trading activities of their counterparts in a related market, with the 
latter getting ahead of the former’s transactions.
46
 Furthermore, the feasi-
bility of various short-trading activities has been aided by decreased bid-
ask spreads in many markets: “[W]hen spreads narrow to a penny or less, 
it’s that much easier for a small informational advantage by the well-
informed trader to become a costly disadvantage to the less-informed 
market maker.”
47
 
                                                                                                                         
Kim & Robert E. Verrecchia, Market Liquidity and Volume Around Earnings Announce-
ments, 17 J. ACCT. & ECON. 41, 44 (1994) (“The ability of information processors to 
produce superior assessments of a firm’s performance on the basis of an earnings an-
nouncement provides them with a comparative information advantage over market mak-
ers.”). 
45 DURBIN, supra note 17, at 93–94. The existence of such market participants, which 
are exemplified by high-frequency traders, explains both why traditional market makers 
have to catch on in terms of technology and why high-frequency traders themselves are 
becoming a part of the market making industry. See id. at vi, 92–94; see also Letter from 
Paul O’Donnell, Chief Operating Officer & Anna Westbury, Head of Compliance and 
Regulatory Affairs, BATS Trading Ltd., to the Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators 2 (Apr. 
30, 2010), available at http://www.batstrading.co.uk/resources/publications/BATSEurope 
_CESRmicrostructuresubmission_20100430.pdf (“The democratisation of market making 
is now such that any appropriately constituted firm can become a liquidity provider. 
However, such liquidity providers have automated their trading in order that they are able 
to remain efficient and competitive.”); Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & Chief Exec. Offic-
er, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments Before the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Commit-
tee on Emerging Regulatory Issues 1 (June 22, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments 
/265-26/265-26-23.pdf (“[High-frequency traders] have elbowed out Market Makers by 
copying or even bettering Market Makers’ quotes but for very small sizes.”). On the other 
hand, the set of techniques for providing liquidity employed by high-frequency traders 
tends to differ from those employed by traditional market makers: “[T]he high-frequency 
trader must resort to more innovative, aggressive, and (some would say) predatory strate-
gies than those of traditional market-makers.... The high-frequency trader is also more 
selective than the pure market-maker when it comes to choosing which securities to trade 
....” DURBIN, supra note 17, at 40. For a further analysis of these distinctions, see SEC’s 
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 2, at 3607–08. 
46 DURBIN, supra note 17, at 69–70. 
47 Id. at 94. 
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Similarly, market makers are likely to be harmed by stale quotes 
caused by various institutional, regulatory, and other frictions.
48
 This prob-
lem is compounded in options markets “because of the increased difficulty 
of updating quotations in multiple series of options on the same underly-
ing security, increasing the risk that a trader may trade against a still-
displayed stale price.”
49
 One historical illustration points to courtroom 
struggles between market makers and “SOES bandits” and “RAES ban-
dits,” short-term traders exploiting stale quotes for stocks on NASDAQ 
and for options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), respec-
tively, via small-sized transactions.
50
 The existence of “flash or-
ders”/“step-up mechanisms” in options markets is also rationalized as a 
response by market makers to the intertwined concerns about stale quotes 
                                                 
48 Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 397 & n.33; 
see also INT’L SEC. EXCH., POSITION PAPER ON FLASH ORDERS IN THE U.S. OPTIONS 
MARKET 3 n.1 (2009), available at http://www.ise.com/assets/files/about_ise/ISE_Posi 
tion_Paper_on_Flash_Website.pdf (“[T]he market could move so quickly that a liquidity 
provider may not be able to update his quote quickly enough to avoid an opportunistic 
professional trader from trading against the still-displayed stale price.”); Jon “Doctor J” 
Najarian, A New Options Game: The Market Taker, in MASTER TRADERS: STRATEGIES 
FOR SUPERIOR RETURNS FROM TODAY’S TOP TRADERS 205, 208 (Fari Hamzei ed., 2006) 
(“The market makers ... [may] find themselves on the other side of thousands of options 
contracts at a price that was stale by a second—and more times than not, the advantage 
will be to the computerized trading program and not to the market maker ....”); Thomas 
Peterffy, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments Before 
the 2010 General Assembly of the World Federation of Exchanges 6 (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://interactivebrokers.com/download/worldFederationOfExchanges.pdf (“It obviously 
takes much longer for the market maker to move thousands of quotes than for the [high-
frequency trader] to hit a handful.”). 
49 Letter from Thomas F. Price, Managing Dir., Equity Options Trading Comm., Sec. 
Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-95.pdf; see 
also Letter from Michael J. Simon, Sec’y, Int’l Sec. Exch., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 9 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/com 
ments/s7-21-09/s72109-83.pdf (“By providing liquidity to multiple series of options on 
the same underlying instrument options market makers expose themselves to much great-
er risk than their equity counterparts. Persons ‘sweeping’ liquidity in the options market 
can hit multiple quotations virtually simultaneously, requiring market makers to buy (or 
sell) a much higher dollar amount of securities than in the cash market.”). 
50 See Cathedral Trading, LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 199 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855–
56 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Datek Sec. Corp v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 
230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For background information on “SOES bandits” and “RAES 
bandits,” see Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 109 
n.119; Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 397 n.33. 
Options market makers on the Pacific Stock Exchange also experienced a similar prob-
lem. See Laura Johnson, P-Coast Intros Measures to Protect Market Makers from Hi-
Tech Arbitrage, WALL ST. LETTER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 1. 
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and short-term informed trading.
51
 A much earlier example similarly 
points to the harm to options market makers on the CBOE from “tape 
racing,” the practice of taking “advantage of time disparities between the 
actual trades [in underlying securities] and the transaction being dissemi-
nated via the price reporting system .... result[ing] in smaller, less liquid 
[options] markets.”
52
 Furthermore, recent proposals to impose a mandato-
ry minimum duration for quotes were criticized, because “the likelihood 
that your quotes become stale [would] increase significantly.... [allowing 
others] to trade on your outdated quotes and thus pocket an easy profit. 
Effectively as a market maker you would be short a strangle every time 
you post a two sided market.”
53
 Turning to empirical evidence, one study 
found a positive correlation between the speed of quote adjustment and 
realized spreads as a measure of market makers’ revenues for stocks on 
                                                 
51 See INT’L SEC. EXCH., supra note 48, at 3 (“[L]iquidity providers may rationally de-
termine not to publicly display the full size they are willing to trade at specific price 
points in today’s rapidly moving electronic markets due to ‘pick off’ concerns. However, 
these market participants may be willing to provide liquidity when shown a flash order.”) 
(footnote omitted); Letter from Thomas F. Price, Managing Dir., Equity Options Trading 
Comm., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09 
/s72109-145.pdf (“Quoting in size ... increases the risk to the market-maker of losses 
resulting from having quotes opportunistically accessed by sophisticated traders who may 
have superior information or take advantage of the momentary lags in a market-maker’s 
ability to update quotes to reflect new information that the market-maker receives.... [A] 
ban on flash orders would reduce the incentive of market makers on traditional exchanges 
to quote in size ....”); Larry Harris, The Economics of Flash Orders 4 (Dec. 4, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.sec.gov/com 
ments/s7-21-09/s72109-97.pdf (“[F]lash facilities ... allow [market makers] to avoid 
offering liquidity to high speed traders who have learned about material information 
moments before [them] .... This information may include electronically transmitted 
headlines or information about the prices of correlated securities. In either event, liquidity 
suppliers who offer firm quotes risk losing to faster well-informed traders.”). However, 
one point of view is that “flash orders increase the probability that a displayed quotation 
will trade with an informed order, which decreases the incentive to display aggressive 
quotations,” with corresponding implications for liquidity. Letter from John A. McCar-
thy, Gen. Counsel, Global Elec. Trading Co., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 3 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09 
/s72109-142.pdf. 
52 C.B.O.E. MARKET MAKER ASS’N, MARKET MAKER REPORT ON THE ISSUE OF TAPE 
RACING 3 (1976), http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers 
/1970/1976_0429_TapeRacingT.pdf. 
53 Thierry Rijper et al., Optiver Holding B.V., High Frequency Trading 15 (Dec. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://optiver.com/cor 
porate/hft.pdf. 
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the NYSE,
54
 while another study of the same trading venue even sug-
gested that “designated market makers’ attention constraints on earnings-
announcement days affect the liquidity of the non-announcement stocks 
they handle.”
55
 
Overall, the existence of short-term informed trading based on some 
combination of uneven distribution of information, as well as different 
capabilities with respect to its acquisition, processing, and aggregation, 
stale quotes, and transaction cost and speed advantages is a permanent 
fixture of securities markets that is fueled by technological developments. 
Furthermore, this type of trading, whether justly or unjustly called “para-
sitic” or “predatory,” has little to do with true insider trading and its regu-
lation.
56
 Such trading activities, given the short-lived nature of the under-
lying information and corresponding difficulties with inventory 
management, are likely to be more harmful to market makers than insider 
trading, translating into a more significant adverse impact on market li-
quidity. Perhaps this type of trading, rather than insider trading, is primari-
ly captured in empirical research that links better market liquidity or 
smaller adverse selection costs with non-anonymity of transactions and 
reputation of intermediaries or proposes an information-based explanation 
for the practice of price improvements offered by market makers to se-
                                                 
54 Alex Boulatov et al., Dealer Attention, the Speed of Quote Adjustment to Informa-
tion, and Net Dealer Revenue, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1531, 1531 (2009). 
55 Bidisha Chakrabarty & Pamela C. Moulton, Earnings Announcements and Atten-
tion Constraints: The Role of Market Design, J. ACCT. & ECON. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 1) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357338. 
56 As an illustration of the uncertain split between insider trading and informed trad-
ing in empirical research, several studies have indicated that, in certain situations, institu-
tional investors possess information-based trading advantages, but this phenomenon is at 
least partially attributable to factors other than leakages of inside information to these 
market participants. See Benjamin C. Ayers & Robert N. Freeman, Evidence That Analyst 
Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings, 8 
REV. ACCT. STUD. 47, 63–64 (2003); Ekkehart Boehmer & Eric K. Kelley, Institutional 
Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3563, 3592 
(2009); Brian J. Bushee & Theodore H. Goodman, Which Institutional Investors Trade 
Based on Private Information About Earnings and Returns?, 45 J. ACCT. RES. 289, 317–
18 (2007); James Jiambalvo et al., Institutional Ownership and the Extent to Which Stock 
Prices Reflect Future Earnings, 19 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 117, 141 (2002); Bin Ke & 
Kathy Petroni, How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence 
from Their Trading Behavior Before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings In-
creases, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 895, 924–25 (2004); Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, 
Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-Term Institutions Better Informed?, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 892, 920–21 (2009). 
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lected traders.
57
 The distinction between insider trading and other forms of 
informed trading was also recognized—explicitly or implicitly—in the 
context of recent debates on various market structure issues.
58
 Recent 
                                                 
57 See Michael J. Barclay et al., Competition Among Trading Venues: Information and 
Trading on Electronic Communications Networks, 58 J. FIN. 2637, 2638, 2660 (2003) 
(analyzing anonymity in the context of equity trading on NASDAQ and electronic com-
munications networks); Robert Battalio et al., Reputation Effects in Trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange, 62 J. FIN. 1243, 1269–70 (2007) (analyzing reputation in the con-
text of equity trading on the NYSE); Khoury et al., supra note 30, at 226 (analyzing price 
improvement in the context of options trading on the Boston Options Exchange); Kaun 
Y. Lee & Kee H. Chung, Information-Based Trading and Price Improvement, 36 J. BUS. 
FIN. & ACCT. 754, 771 (2009) (analyzing price improvement in the context of equity 
trading on the NYSE and NASDAQ); Erik Theissen, Trader Anonymity, Price Formation 
and Liquidity, 7 EUR. FIN. REV. 1, 13, 23–24 (2003) (analyzing anonymity and price 
improvement in the context of equity trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange); Louis R. 
Mercorelli et al., Modeling Adverse Selection on Electronic Order-Driven Markets 35 
(Mar. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1107049 (analyzing anonymity in the context of equity trading on the 
Australian Stock Exchange). The link between greater anonymity and higher bid-ask 
spreads was also found in commodity futures markets, in which the problem of asymme-
tric information is less important. See Henry L. Bryant & Michael S. Haigh, Bid-Ask 
Spreads in Commodity Futures Markets, 14 APPLIED. FIN. ECON. 923, 933–35 (2004) 
(data from the London International Financial Futures Exchange). However, several 
empirical studies in the context of equity trading came to a different conclusion. See 
Carole Comerton-Forde & Kar Mei Tang, Anonymity, Liquidity and Fragmentation, 12 J. 
FIN. MKTS. 337, 338 (2009) (arguing that the introduction of anonymity on the Australian 
Stock Exchange resulted in “the reduction in trading costs ... driven mainly by a reduc-
tion in the adverse selection component of the spread in large stocks”); Thierry Foucault 
et al., Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1707, 1740 (2007) (finding that the introduction of anonymity on the Paris Bourse de-
creased bid-ask spreads, and attributing this phenomenon to the use of volatility informa-
tion by certain traders); Yusif Simaan et al., Market Maker Quotation Behavior and 
Pretrade Transparency, 58 J. FIN. 1247, 1264, 1266 (2003) (suggesting that the introduc-
tion of anonymity on NASDAQ decreased bid-ask spreads by making dealer collusion 
more problematic). For an additional survey of empirical literature on the link between 
anonymity and market liquidity, which distinguishes between pre-trade and post-trade 
anonymity, see Alexandra Hachmeister & Dirk Schiereck, Dancing in the Dark: Post-
Trade Anonymity, Liquidity and Informed Trading, 34 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 
145, 147–48 (2010). 
58 See Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-Frequency Trading, and Other Market Struc-
ture Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) [hereinafter Market Structure Hear-
ings] (statement of Daniel Mathisson, Managing Director and Head of Advanced 
Execution Services, Credit Suisse) (“Who would benefit from additional quantitative 
information [from ‘dark pools’] hitting the tape in real time, fundamental long-term 
investors or short-term information-based traders?”); SEC’s Concept Release on Equity 
Market Structure, supra note 2, at 3612 (“Liquidity providers generally consider the 
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courtroom struggles also reflect tensions between market makers and 
certain types of short-term traders.
59
 Additionally, it is possible that the 
continuing existence of the practice of payment of order flow by market 
makers to brokers for diverted—typically retail—orders, which was earlier 
attributed to informational disadvantages of retail customers vis-à-vis 
market makers,
60
 at least partially reflects certain advantages of short-term 
traders in today’s securities markets.
61
 
                                                                                                                         
orders of individual investors very attractive to trade with because such investors are 
presumed on average to not be as informed about short-term price movements as are 
professional traders.”); Letter from Robert A. Bright, Chief Exec. Officer, Bright Trading 
LLC, et al. to the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-246.pdf (“When we discuss informed order flow, we are not 
referring to market participants with inside information, we are referring to market partic-
ipant’s orders that are on the right side of the market in the short-term.”). 
59 For instance, one case addressed the conflict between options market makers and 
sophisticated direct access customers and pointed to the alleged discrimination of orders 
placed by direct access customers by options market makers, including interference with 
execution and mishandling of such orders. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist 
Partners, No. 04 C 397, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29175, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2010). 
The plaintiffs themselves stated that their trading strategies were based on “information 
and/or technological capabilities that are superior to that of Specialist Defendants and 
other traders in the market.” Consol. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 43, Last 
Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 
2006) (No. 04 C 397), 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 10704, at *43. 
60 See, e.g., JON NAJARIAN, HOW I TRADE OPTIONS 185–86 (2001) (“[R]etail custom-
ers are looking at delayed quotes, which is a snapshot of where the market was 20 mi-
nutes ago.... Trading against someone who has a different timeframe from you can be 
profitable and is how payment for order flow came into being.”). For a further discussion 
of the practice of payment for order flow in the context of informational asymmetry, see 
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 421 n.136. How-
ever, this practice is likely to owe its existence to a number of factors. See, e.g., Gilman 
v. BHC Sec., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1420, 1423 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing payment for 
order flow as a “volume discount” and a “means by which the market makers compete 
with one another”). 
61 See Jonathan Spicer, For Wall Street, Dumb Money Pays, REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2010, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/17/us-markets-dumb-money-idUST 
RE6BG2H320101217 (discussing the practice of payment for order flow and stating that 
“in contrast to high-frequency traders, retailers don’t have reams of algorithmic code and 
rapid-fire trading software that often shows where stocks are headed in the next few 
milliseconds”); see also Letter from Suhas Daftuar, Managing Dir., Hudson River Trad-
ing LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 8 (Apr. 30, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-171.pdf (arguing that “[t]he 
existence of payment for order flow and price improvement are generally driven by OTC 
market maker’s ability to discriminate among potential customers, taking the other side 
of individual investor orders which, unlike orders from proprietary trading firms or insti-
tutional investors, are unlikely to have a short-term adverse impact on the liquidity pro-
vider”). 
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Several empirical studies examined the impact of insider trading on li-
quidity of equity markets, but the results are ambiguous and contradicto-
ry.
62 
More generally, it is hard to isolate, identify, and measure insider 
trading and its impact on market liquidity. Furthermore, analyzing specific 
concealed or registered transactions by insiders has its limitations. Con-
cealed insider trading is not necessarily detected or even suspected ex 
ante, and, theoretically, there may be a long-term increase in bid-ask 
spreads rather than frequent temporary increases to compensate for such 
losses. Similarly, the information content of registered transactions may be 
hard to separate from the noise generated by idiosyncratic liquidity needs 
and individual judgments of insiders. Furthermore, this content is more 
likely to convey “soft” information with a relatively long time horizon 
                                                 
62 See J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. 
ECON. 191, 218 (2000) (arguing that corporate policies regulating insiders’ registered 
transactions decrease bid-ask spreads on the NYSE); Sugato Chakravarty & John J. 
McConnell, An Analysis of Prices, Bid/Ask Spreads, and Bid and Ask Depths Surround-
ing Ivan Boesky’s Illegal Trading in Carnation’s Stock, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1997, at 
18, 32–33 (examining illegal insider trading before a corporate acquisition and finding 
unchanged bid-ask spreads and greater market depths on the NYSE); Louis Cheng et al., 
The Effects of Insider Trading on Liquidity, 14 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 467, 481 (2006) (ex-
amining directors’ registered transactions and arguing that they increase bid-ask spreads 
and decrease market depths on the HKSE on the days when such transactions are ex-
ecuted); Bradford Cornell & Erik R. Sirri, The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to 
Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1031, 1054–55 (1992) (examining illegal insider trading 
before a corporate acquisition and finding that bid-ask spreads on the NYSE in fact 
decreased); Richard Frankel & Xu Li, Characteristics of a Firm’s Information Environ-
ment and the Information Asymmetry Between Insiders and Outsiders, 37 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 229, 253 (2004) (finding that a higher profitability of insiders’ registered transac-
tions is associated with increased bid-ask spreads on various trading venues); Katherine 
Gleason, Does Market Maker Competition Affect the Response to Insider Trading?, 17 
APPLIED FIN. ECON. 691, 699 (2007) (examining insiders’ registered transactions and 
finding that they increase bid-ask spreads but do not alter market depths on NASDAQ); 
Walayet A. Khan et al., The Impact of Insider Trading on Market Liquidity in the 
NASDAQ Market, 21 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 11, 19 (2005) (examining insiders’ registered 
transactions and finding that they decrease bid-ask spreads on NASDAQ on the days 
when they are executed but suggesting that market makers still recoup their losses to 
insiders through increased bid-ask spreads in the long run); Suchi Mishra et al., Spread 
Behavior Around Board Meetings for Firms with Concentrated Insider Ownership, 12 J. 
FIN. MKTS. 592, 594 (2009) (examining insiders’ registered transactions around board 
meetings for firms with concentrated ownership and arguing that they increase bid-ask 
spreads on the NYSE); Diane Del Guercio et al., An Analysis of the Price and Liquidity 
Effects of Illegal Insider Trading 2 (July 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1784528 (examining illegal insider trading 
on various trading venues and finding “no measurable effects [on market liquidity] as 
captured by standard metrics such as quoted and effective spreads, quoted depths, and 
information-based price impacts.”). 
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instead of more specific bits of data relating to immediate developments.
63
 
Thus, transactions based on this “soft” information are less likely to inflict 
harm on a market maker. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISENTANGLING INFORMED TRADING, 
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY, AND UNCERTAINTY 
Another key issue is the necessity of disentangling informed trading, 
informational asymmetry, and uncertainty. Bid-ask spreads are partly 
determined by factors related to, but not requiring the existence of, in-
formed trading. These interrelated factors include the quality and flow of 
disclosure, price volatility of the security in question, and uncertainty 
more generally, all of which have a direct impact on market makers’ in-
ventory holding costs.
64
 Linkages among these factors and market liquidi-
ty have been suggested by several recent empirical studies,
65
 although 
                                                 
63 Recent empirical studies lead to a number of conclusions about registered transac-
tions by insiders. See Partha Gangopadhyay et al., Profitability of Insider Trades in 
Extremely Volatile Markets: Evidence from the Stock Market Crash and Recovery in 
2000–2003, 48 Q.J. FIN. & ACCT. 45, 60 (2009) (documenting abnormal gains for insid-
ers’ registered transactions and suggesting that a significant portion of such gains is 
attributable to the use of private information); Adam Kolasinski & Xu Li, Are Corporate 
Managers Savvy About Their Stock Price? Evidence from Insider Trading After Earnings 
Announcements, 29 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 27 (2010) (examining insiders’ registered 
transactions after earnings announcements and suggesting that insiders’ abnormal gains 
are due to their ability to exploit market under-reaction); Lauren Cohen et al., Decoding 
Insider Information 27–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16454, 
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16454.pdf (arguing that an identifiable 
subset of insiders’ registered transactions is information-based and predicts future news 
and events for individual firms); Itzhak Ben-David & Darren Roulstone, Do Insiders Act 
as Arbitrageurs? 30–32 (July 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://fisher.osu.edu/~roulstone_1/20090212_writeup_IRISK1.pdf (conclud-
ing that insiders’ abnormal gains from registered transactions are largely due to their 
ability to exploit market mispricing of public information rather than the use of private 
information). 
64 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 133, 
163–64. 
65 See Wei-Peng Chen et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Liquidity: Analysis of 
S&P Transparency and Disclosure Rankings, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE 644, 657–58 
(2007) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on the NYSE and better information 
transparency and disclosure policies); Alex Frino & Stewart Jones, The Impact of Man-
dated Cash Flow Disclosure on Bid-Ask Spreads, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1373, 1373 
(2005) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on the Australian Stock Exchange and 
mandatory disclosure of cash flows); Frank L. Heflin et al., Disclosure Policy and Market 
Liquidity: Impact of Depth Quotes and Order Sizes, 22 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 829, 829 
(2005) (linking higher market liquidity for stocks on various trading venues, as measured 
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there is a tendency to attribute these linkages to informed trading rather 
than inventory holding costs. For instance, one study treated “a measure of 
the disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts .... as a proxy for the in-
formational disadvantage of market makers with respect to informed trad-
ers” instead of a proxy for volatility or uncertainty.
66
 Empirical research 
that points to the correlation between greater informational advantages 
enjoyed by certain equity market makers and greater market liquidity
67
 
may also reflect other factors, such as better pricing accuracy due to de-
creased uncertainty, rather than the informed trading effect.
68
 
                                                                                                                         
by bid-ask spreads and market depths, and better disclosure policies); Kiridaran Kanaga-
retnam et al., Relationship Between Analyst Forecast Properties and Equity Bid-Ask 
Spreads and Depths Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & 
ACCT. 1773, 1797 (2005) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on the NYSE and the 
AMEX and lower information asymmetry, as measured by analysts’ forecast dispersion, 
forecast reversion volatility, and coverage); Mark Lang et al., Transparency, Liquidity, 
and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most, J. ACCT. 
RES. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 37–38) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1323514 (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on various trading 
venues and greater transparency, as measured by the occurrence of earnings management, 
quality of accounting standards, quality of auditors, analyst following, and accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts); Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, The Role of Information Asymmetry 
and Financial Reporting Quality in Debt Trading: Evidence from the Secondary Loan 
Market, 46 J. ACCT. & ECON. 240, 240–42 (2008) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for 
syndicated loans in over-the-counter markets and conservative financial reporting and the 
availability of firm-specific and loan-specific credit ratings); Haiyan Zhou, Auditing 
Standards, Increased Accounting Disclosure, and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from 
an Emerging Market, 26 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 584, 584 (2007) (linking lower bid-ask 
spreads for stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
and additional disclosures required by new auditing standards); Siddharth Shankar et al., 
Spread Behavior and Multiple Restatement Announcements 2 (Aug. 26, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462238 
(documenting higher bid-ask spreads for stocks on the NYSE around restatement an-
nouncements). 
66 Andros Gregoriou et al., Information Asymmetry and the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence 
from the UK, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1801, 1801 (2005). 
67 See Shantaram P. Hegde & Robert E. Miller, Market-Making in Initial Public Of-
ferings of Common Stocks: An Empirical Analysis, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
75, 87 (1989) (data from NASDAQ in the context of underwriting activities); Simi Kedia 
& Xing Zhou, Local Market Makers, Liquidity and Market Quality, 14 J. FIN. MKTS. 540, 
540 (2011) (data from NASDAQ in the context of geographic proximity); Leonardo 
Madureira & Shane Underwood, Information, Sell-Side Research, and Market Making, 
90 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 126 (2008) (data from NASDAQ in the context of securities re-
search); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in 
Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 369 (2008) (data from the NYSE, the 
AMEX, and NASDAQ in the context of board representation). 
68 Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 128 n.220. 
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Several empirical studies attempted to link information asymmetry and 
liquidity of equity markets for spinoffs and tracking stock issuances, given 
a possible impact on the feasibility of different types of informed trading, 
but such studies were also inconclusive and did not separate informed 
trading from other similar factors.
69
 For instance, such structural changes 
may “reduce[] uninformed investors’ uncertainty about the [firm] value,”
70
 
which, in turn, would have an effect on the information environment.
71
 
Thus, this group of studies also demonstrates the relevance of disentan-
glement. 
IV. BID-ASK SPREAD DECOMPOSITION STUDIES 
For estimating the impact of informed trading on different measures of 
bid-ask spreads,
72
 the pivotal position is occupied by bid-ask spread de-
composition studies.
73
 From the methodological perspective, a comparison 
                                                 
69 See John Elder et al., Do Tracking Stocks Reduce Informational Asymmetries? An 
Analysis of Liquidity and Adverse Selection, 28 J. FIN. RES. 197, 211–13 (2005) (finding 
that the introduction of tracking stocks is associated with a relative increase in bid-ask 
spreads and a larger adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms on vari-
ous trading venues); Mark R. Huson & Gregory MacKinnon, Corporate Spinoffs and 
Information Asymmetry Between Investors, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 481, 501–02 (2003) (finding 
higher bid-ask spreads on various trading venues after spinoffs and attributing this phe-
nomenon to more frequent informed trading); Thomas Bates et al., Spinoffs, Spreads, and 
Information Asymmetry 16–17 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at ftp://ns1.ystp.ac.ir/YSTP/1/1/ROOT/DATA/PDF/unclassified/BCSF 
MA99.PDF (finding lower bid-ask spreads on the NYSE after spinoffs and attributing 
this phenomenon to less frequent informed trading, although the impact on the adverse 
selection component was ambiguous). 
70 Michel A. Habib et al., Spinoffs and Information, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 153, 
153 (1997). 
71 See id. at 154. 
72 For the definitions of the “quoted spread,” “effective spread,” and “realized 
spread,” see Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 88 
n.26. Another frequently used metric, the “traded spread,” “reflects trades inside the 
spread but outside the midpoint.” Roger D. Huang & Hans R. Stoll, The Components of 
the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 995, 1000 (1997). A less 
common—and substantively different—definition of the “traded spread” is “the differ-
ence between the average price of trades at the ask side less the average price of trades at 
the bid side” during a specified time period. Hans R. Stoll, Friction, 55 J. FIN. 1479, 1487 
(2000). Yet another metric, the “implied spread,” captures the difference between the pre-
trade ask and bid prices at the same moment. Ananth Madhavan et al., Why Do Security 
Prices Change? A Transaction-Level Analysis of NYSE Stocks, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 1035, 
1040, 1047 (1997). 
73 For a sample of empirical studies comparing various bid-ask spread decomposition 
methodologies, see Bonnie F. Van Ness et al., How Well Do Adverse Selection Compo-
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of absolute or relative bid-ask spreads requires isolating different compo-
nents in order to make conclusions about the impact of informed trading. 
For instance, it has been argued that “[t]he substantially lesser vulnerabili-
ty of stock index futures to insider information is another reason why 
market spreads for futures are substantially smaller than on separate stocks 
that make up the index.”
74
 However, while comparing different markets, 
one must take into account factors that affect other components of bid-ask 
spreads, such as the differences in liquidity and volatility, in addition to 
the impact of other types of informed trading. 
In terms of taxonomy, the three major components identified in the li-
terature are attributed to order processing, inventory holding, and adverse 
selection costs, although the inventory holding component is often omitted 
and thus implicitly lumped together with the other two.
75
 Several studies 
also presumed the existence of additional components that capture such 
factors as non-competitive pricing,
76
 profit markup,
77
 market-wide buy-
ing/selling pressure, and firm-wide inventory holding costs.
78
 As pointed 
out earlier, bid-ask spread decomposition studies have employed different 
methodologies and produced a wide range of estimates for the magnitude 
of the adverse selection component—even for similar methodologies and 
data sets
79
—although one study found that such estimates under different 
methodologies are highly correlated.
80
 This dispersion of results is also 
demonstrated by the below summary of recent bid-ask spread decomposi-
                                                                                                                         
nents Measure Adverse Selection?, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2001, at 77; Jonathan Clarke & 
Kuldeep Shastri, On Information Asymmetry Metrics (Oct. 3, 2001) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author); Thomas Henker et al., The Short-Term Dynamics of Infor-
mation Risk (May 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/dynamicsFMA09.pdf. 
74 Merton H. Miller, International Competitiveness of U.S. Futures Exchanges, 4 J. 
FIN. SERVICES RES. 387, 407 n.7 (1990). 
75 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 149, 173 
n.502. 
76 See, e.g., Patrick de Fontnouvelle et al., How New Entry in Options Markets Af-
fected Market Making and Trading Costs, J. INVESTMENT MGMT., 2d Q. 2005, at 24; 
Mark Klock & D. Timothy McCormick, The Impact of Market Maker Competition on 
Nasdaq Spreads, 34 FIN. REV. 55 (1999). 
77 See, e.g., Eric J. Levin & Robert E. Wright, Estimating the Profit Markup Compo-
nent of the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange, 44 Q. REV. 
ECON. & FIN. 1 (2004). 
78 See, e.g., Thomas Henker & Martin Martens, Spread Decomposition with Common 
Spread Components, 6 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 88 (2010). 
79 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 150–62; 
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 413–17 & nn.94–
114. 
80 Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 17. 
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tion studies for the same trading venue, the NYSE, which are only a small 
part of recent studies of this type analyzing equity securities on various 
trading venues.
81
 
Chung et al. 2004
82
 
  The study uses a sample consisting of thirty-six NYSE 
stocks traded from 1990 to 1991, and transactions of NYSE 
specialists were separated from limit orders,
83
 assuming 
that “the limit order spread is not likely to be determined by 
market-making costs.”
84
 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Timotheos Angelidis & Alexandros Benos, Liquidity Adjusted Value-at-
Risk Based on the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 16 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 835 (2006) 
(data from the Athens Stock Exchange); Najah Attig et al., Effects of Large Shareholding 
on Information Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2875 (2006) (data 
from the Toronto Stock Exchange); Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Managerial Bonding and 
Stock Liquidity: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms, 28 J. ECON. & FIN. 117 (2004) (data 
from the NYSE and the AMEX); Nicolas P.B. Bollen et al., Modeling the Bid/Ask 
Spread: Measuring the Inventory-Holding Premium, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 97 (2004) (data 
from NASDAQ); Charlie X. Cai et al., Trading Frictions and Market Structure: An 
Empirical Analysis, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 563 (2008) (data from the LSE); Huimin 
Chung, Investor Protection and the Liquidity of Cross-Listed Securities: Evidence from 
the ADR Market, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 1485 (2006) (data from the NYSE and 
NASDAQ); Jonathan E. Clarke et al., Corporate Diversification and Asymmetric Infor-
mation: Evidence from Stock Market Trading Characteristics, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 105 
(2004) (data from the NYSE and the AMEX); Alex Frino et al., Liquidity in Auction and 
Specialist Market Structures: Evidence from the Italian Bourse, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 
2581 (2008) (data from the Italian Bourse); Maria Kasch-Haroutounian & Erik Theissen, 
Competition Between Exchanges: Euronext Versus Xetra, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 181 
(2009) (data from Euronext Paris and Xetra); Hung-Neng Lai, The Market Quality of 
Dealer Versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of Moderately Liquid Securities, 34 J. BUS. 
FIN. & ACCT. 349 (2007) (data from the LSE); Mingsheng Li et al., Asymmetric Informa-
tion in the IPO Aftermarket, 40 FIN. REV. 131 (2005) (data from NASDAQ); David 
Michayluk et al., What Do Options Have To Do with It?: Inclusion of Options Market 
Indicators in Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition, 38 ASIA-PAC. J. FIN. STUD. 455 (2009) 
(data from the Australian Stock Exchange); T. Shawn Strother et al., Electronic Commu-
nication Networks, Market Makers, and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 5 INT’L J. 
MANAGERIAL FIN. 81 (2009) (data from NASDAQ); Bonnie F. Van Ness et al., The 
Impact of Market Maker Concentration on Adverse-Selection Costs for Nasdaq Stocks, 
28 J. FIN. RES. 461 (2005) (data from NASDAQ); Robert E. Verrecchia & Joseph Weber, 
Redacted Disclosure, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 791 (2006) (data from the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
NASDAQ). 
82 Kee H. Chung et al., Specialists, Limit-Order Traders, and the Components of the 
Bid-Ask Spread, 39 FIN. REV. 255 (2004). 
83 Id. at 256–58. 
84 Id. at 257. 
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  The study employs two different decomposition methodol-
ogies: (1) the approach applying to quoted spreads and as-
suming the existence of the adverse selection and order 
processing components and (2) the approach applying to ef-
fective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse 
selection and “transitory” components.
85
 
  The estimates of the adverse selection component are as 
follows: for specialist transactions, 9% of the effective 
spread and 15% of the quoted spread; for specialist and 
limit order transactions combined, 10% of the effective 
spread and 20% of the quoted spread; and for limit order 
transactions, 11% of the effective spread and 20% of the 
quoted spread.
86
 
  The following explanation for the difference between spe-
cialist and limit order transactions was given: “To the ex-
tent that specialists can discriminate between informed and 
uninformed orders, specialists are likely to execute low-
information-content orders proportionately more frequently 
(at better prices) than limit-order traders.... [or] let limit or-
ders execute against high-information-content orders by not 
posting their proprietary interests at times of high informa-
tion asymmetry.”
87
 
Chakravarty et al. 2005
88
 
  The study uses a sample consisting of 304 decimalized 
NYSE stocks and a matching sample of non-decimalized 
NASDAQ stocks, with stocks in both samples traded in 
2001.
89
 
                                                 
85 Id. at 260–62. 
86 Id. at 266 tbl.5. 
87 Id. at 265–67. 
88 Sugato Chakravarty et al., The Effect of Decimalization on Trade Size and Adverse 
Selection Costs, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1063 (2005). 
89 Id. at 1065. 
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  The study employs two different decomposition methodol-
ogies: (1) the approach applying to quoted spreads and as-
suming the existence of the adverse selection and order 
processing components and (2) the approach applying to ef-
fective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse 
selection and order processing components.
90
 
  The estimates of the adverse selection component are as 
follows: for the NYSE stocks before decimalization, 46% 
of the quoted spread and 43% of the effective spread; for 
the NYSE stocks after decimalization, 52% of the quoted 
spread and 48% of the effective spread; and for the 
NASDAQ stocks, from 20 to 21% of the quoted spread and 
from 18 to 19% of the effective spread.
91
 
  Both decomposition methodologies indicate a large de-
crease of the adverse selection component in absolute terms 
for the NYSE stocks and no change in absolute terms for 
the NASDAQ stocks.
92
 
Prucyk 2005
93
 
  The study uses a sample consisting of thirty NYSE stocks 
traded from 1993 to 1994.
94
 
  The study employs a decomposition methodology applying 
to traded spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse 
selection, order processing, and inventory holding compo-
nents.
95
 
  The study hypothesized that “[b]oth increases and decreas-
es in volatility should cause an increase in the adverse se-
lection component of the spread.”
96
 
  Depending on the magnitude of volatility changes, the ad-
verse selection component varies from 21 to 24% of the 
traded spread.
97
 
                                                 
90 Id. at 1068–71. 
91 Id. at 1072 tbl.2. 
92 Id. at 1073–74. 
93 Brian Prucyk, Specialist Risk Attitudes and the Bid-Ask Spread, 40 FIN. REV. 223 
(2005). 
94 Id. at 228, 230–31. 
95 Id. at 226–27. 
96 Id. at 225. 
97 Id. at 251 tbl.9. 
28 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:001 
 
  The conclusion is that “the widening in spreads and the de-
crease in depth [associated with changes in volatility] arises 
not in response to worries about trading with better-
informed investors, but because of increased inventory 
risks for the specialist.”
98
 
Serednyakov 2005
99
 
  The study uses a sample consisting of 118 NYSE stocks 
and a matching sample of NASDAQ stocks, with stocks in 
both samples traded in 1996, 1999, and 2002.
100
 
  The study employs a decomposition methodology applying 
to traded spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse 
selection, order processing, and inventory holding compo-
nents.
101
 
  Depending on the trade classification method, the estimates 
of the adverse selection component of the traded spread are 
53% and 77% for the NYSE stocks and 41% and 46% for 
the NASDAQ stocks.
102
 
Chen et al. 2007
103
 
  The study uses a sample consisting of every S&P 500 stock 
traded in 2002 on the NYSE—424 stocks altogether.
104
 
  The study employs a decomposition methodology applying 
to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the ad-
verse selection and order processing components.
105
 
  The adverse selection component constitutes 41% of the ef-
fective spread.
106
 
                                                 
98 Id. at 253–54. 
99 Alexey Serednyakov, A Model of the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread (Nov. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/ab 
stract=754346. 
100 Id. at 17, 45 tbl.IX. 
101 Id. at 2–3. 
102 Id. at 45 tbl.IX. 
103 Chen et al., supra note 65. 
104 Id. at 648–49. However, only 341 stocks were deemed to have sufficient data for 
the purposes of the study. Id. at 649. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 652 tbl.1. 
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Jiang et al. 2009
107
 
  The study uses samples of 809, 791, and 426 pairs of 
matched NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, with stocks in each 
sample traded in 2001 after decimalization.
108
 
  The study employs two different decomposition methodol-
ogies: (1) the approach applying to effective spreads and 
assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order 
processing components and (2) the approach applying to ef-
fective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse 
selection and “transitory” components.
109
 
  Depending on the sample and methodology, the estimates 
of the adverse selection component of the effective spread 
vary from 40 to 60% for the NYSE stocks and from 6 to 
10% for the NASDAQ stocks.
110
 
Hegde et al. 2010
111
 
  The study uses a sample of eight NYSE stocks in the 
NASDAQ’s dual listing program traded from 2004 to 
2007.
112
 
  The study employs two different decomposition methodol-
ogies: (1) the approach applying to effective spreads and 
assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order 
processing components and (2) the approach applying to ef-
fective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse 
selection and “transitory” components.
113
 
  Depending on the methodology, the estimates of the ad-
verse selection component of the effective spread vary from 
62 to 65% for the NYSE data and from 50 to 60% for the 
NASDAQ data.
114
 
                                                 
107 Christine X. Jiang et al., Adverse Selection Costs for NASDAQ and NYSE After 
Decimalization, 18 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 205 (2009). 
108 Id. at 205–06. 
109 Id. at 207, app. A, at 210–11. 
110 Id. at 208 tbl.3. 
111 Shantaram Hegde et al., Competitive Stock Markets: Evidence from Companies’ 
Dual Listings on the NYSE and NASDAQ, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 77. 
112 Id. at 78. 
113 Id. at 84. 
114 Id. at 84 tbl.5. 
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Hendershott et al. 2011
115
 
  The study uses a sample of 1082 NYSE stocks traded from 
2002 to 2003 around the introduction of the “autoquote” 
mechanism, considered to be a likely cause of an increase 
in algorithmic trading.
116
 
  The study employs a decomposition methodology applying 
to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the ad-
verse selection and realized spread components.
117
 
  Depending on market capitalization, the estimate of the ad-
verse selection component of the effective spread varies 
from 67 to 77%.
118
 
  The study concluded that the introduction of the “auto-
quote” mechanism resulted in narrowed effective and 
quoted spreads and attributed this change to “a sharp de-
cline in adverse selection, or equivalently a decrease in the 
amount of price discovery associated with trades.”
119
 
Overall, estimates of the adverse selection component for the NYSE 
data vary from 9 to 77%, and there is a substantial divergence, from 6 to 
60%, for the NASDAQ data as well. This dispersion raises doubts about 
the accuracy of bid-ask spread decomposition methodologies. Indeed, one 
common proxy for the adverse selection component is a measure of the 
price impact of transactions,
120
 but this approach ignores the blurry line 
between informed trading and price discovery and makes it problematic to 
isolate the contribution of inventory management-related price adjust-
ments by market makers. Another potential complication is that “spread 
decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse-selection risk 
                                                 
115 Terrence Hendershott et al., Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J. 
FIN. 1 (2011). 
116 Id. at 13–14, 16. 
117 Id. at 10–11. 
118 Id. at 17 tbl.I. 
119 Id. at 3. 
120 See, e.g., Hendrik Bessembinder & Herbert M. Kaufman, A Cross-Exchange Com-
parison of Execution Costs and Information Flow for NYSE-Listed Stocks, 46 J. FIN. 
ECON. 293, 303 (1997); Glosten & Harris, supra note 44, at 124–25; Hendershott et al., 
supra note 115, at 11. 
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when [market makers] choose depth.”
121
 Furthermore, one study con-
cluded that 
standard techniques applied in order to decompose bid-ask spreads into 
adverse selection and other components produce spurious positive and 
economically and statistically significant adverse selection component 
[sic] in the world where no adverse selection exists. This finding im-
plies that standard asymmetric information models may not actually be 
testing asymmetric information.... [A]n increase in serial correlation 
that is attributable to tick size reduction only but not due to a change in 
adverse selection (in fact, in the absence of adverse selection) may be 
mistakenly identified by a spread decomposition algorithm as being in-
dicative of a genuine shift in adverse selection.122 
Even if a given bid-ask spread decomposition methodology is reliable, 
it is unclear to what extent the adverse selection component captures the 
impact of insider trading, as opposed to other forms of informed trad-
ing.
123
 For instance, several empirical studies argued that the introduction 
of derivatives, such as equity options or single stock futures, decreases 
bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and abso-
lute terms for the underlying market because informed traders “migrate” to 
derivatives markets,
124
 but this relationship is consistent with both insider 
trading and other types of informed trading sensitive to leverage and 
transaction costs. Furthermore, several empirical studies examining such 
issues as execution speed
125
 and margin requirements
126
 are more consis-
                                                 
121 Cecilia Caglio & Kenneth A. Kavajecz, A Specialist’s Quoted Depth as a Strategic 
Choice Variable: An Application to Spread Decomposition Models, 29 J. FIN. RES. 367, 
367 (2006). 
122 Lynn Doran et al., Tick Size and Adverse Selection: Spurious Effects Arising from 
Serial Correlation 25–26 (Mar. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360323. 
123 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 162–63. 
124 See Raman Kumar et al., The Impact of Options Trading on the Market Quality of 
the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 717, 717–19, 726 (1998) 
(discussing the impact of the introduction of equity options on stocks on various trading 
venues); Shastri et al., supra note 9, at 341, 348–50 (analyzing the impact of the introduc-
tion of single stock futures on stocks on the NYSE and NASDAQ). But see Petri 
Sahlström, Impact of Stock Option Listings on Return and Risk Characteristics in Fin-
land, 10 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 19, 29–32 (2001) (finding that the introduction of 
equity options decreased bid-ask spreads for stocks on the Helsinki Stock Exchange but 
did not change the relative size of the adverse selection component vis-à-vis the order 
processing/inventory holding component). 
125 See Terrence Hendershott & Pamela C. Moulton, Automation, Speed, and Stock 
Market Quality: The NYSE’s Hybrid, 14 J. FIN. MKTS. 568, 601 (2011) (documenting an 
increase in bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute 
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tent with reflecting informed trading other than insider trading. On the 
other hand, given the observation that a smaller tick size leads to greater 
amounts of short-term informed trading that is harmful to market mak-
ers,
127
 and the conjecture that “[d]ecimalization makes [it] easier and 
cheaper for informed traders to break-up their large trades and jump in 
front of other orders,”
128
 empirical evidence on the impact of decimaliza-
tion on the adverse selection component is ambiguous.
129
 
Another key issue concerns bid-ask spread decomposition studies for 
data sets from markets in foreign currency, government debt, and basket- 
and index-based securities. In these markets, the problem of asymmetric 
information is less important, and the very definitions of “insider trading” 
and, to some degree, “informed trading” become ambiguous.
130
 On the 
                                                                                                                         
terms for stocks on the NYSE after the introduction of a trading mechanism that substan-
tially lowered the execution time for market orders). But see Andreas Storkenmaier & 
Ryan Riordan, The Effect of Automated Trading on Market Quality: Evidence from the 
New York Stock Exchange, 23 LECTURE NOTES IN BUS. INFO. PROCESSING 11, 23–24 
(2009) (documenting a decrease in bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component 
in relative and absolute terms after the introduction of this trading mechanism); John 
Ritter, The Effect of the NYSE’s Hybrid Conversion on the Bid-Ask Spread 3 (Nov. 
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (documenting smaller quoted and 
larger effective spreads after the introduction of this trading mechanism and showing that 
the conclusion of whether the adverse selection component has increased or decreased 
depends on the methodology); see also Ryan Riordan & Andreas Storkenmaier, Latency, 
Liquidity and Price Discovery 24–25 (Mar. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247482 (documenting smaller bid-
ask spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms for stocks 
on Xetra after the introduction of a new trading mechanism that decreased latency). 
126 See Gordon J. Alexander et al., Margin Regulation and Market Quality: A Micro-
structure Analysis, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 549, 571 (2004) (documenting no change in bid-ask 
spreads and an increase in the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms 
for stocks on NASDAQ when they become margin-eligible). 
127 DURBIN, supra note 17, at 94. 
128 Jiang et al., supra note 107, at 205. 
129 See Chakravarty et al., supra note 88, at 1079 (documenting a significant increase 
of the adverse selection component and an overall decrease of adverse selection costs in 
absolute terms for stocks on the NYSE after decimalization); Scott Gibson et al., The 
Effect of Decimalization on the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 12 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 121, 121, 145–46 (2003) (documenting smaller bid-ask spreads for 
stocks on the NYSE after decimalization, which was attributed almost entirely to a de-
crease of the order processing component, and hypothesizing that this result could be 
attributed to the existence of non-competitive pricing). 
130 See, e.g., Campbell R. Harvey & Roger D. Huang, Volatility in the Foreign Cur-
rency Futures Market, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 543, 545 (1991) (“[T]he definition of private 
information and informed traders is not clear in the FX market.”); In Joon Kim et al., 
Time-Varying Bid-Ask Components of Nikkei 225 Index Futures on SIMEX, 10 PAC.-
BASIN FIN. J. 183, 186 (2002) (“[T]he price of stock index futures does not depend on the 
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other hand, transactions on information about macroeconomic, industry-
wide, and other similar factors not absorbed by the market and “inside-
like” information, such as the advance knowledge of an upcoming ma-
croeconomic policy announcement, exchange-rate intervention, or is-
suance of government bonds, as well as order flow and inventory-related 
information, certainly can and do occur. Bid-ask spread decomposition 
studies for these markets have also yielded a wide range of results—even 
for similar assets—and, in several instances, estimates of the adverse se-
lection component seem too high, sometimes exceeding 100%. This varia-
tion is visible in over-the-counter foreign currency markets,
131
 with several 
studies questioning whether asymmetric information has any influence on 
liquidity in these markets.
132
 Markets for government securities and their 
futures display an even wider range of estimates,
133
 although one study 
                                                                                                                         
idiosyncratic information of individual stocks, but it is more dependent on the economic 
conditions and general stock market information .... [T]he number of well-informed 
traders is far less in stock index futures markets than in stock markets.”); Toni Gravelle, 
The Market Microstructure of Dealership Equity and Government Securities Markets: 
How They Differ 2 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs11gra_b.pdf (“It is unclear to what extent there exists private 
information about the value of government securities.”). 
131 See Geir Høidal Bjønnes & Dagfinn Rime, Dealer Behavior and Trading Systems 
in Foreign Exchange Markets, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 571, 589, 590 tbl.6 (2005) (estimating the 
adverse selection component of the effective spread, depending on the currency, from 50 
to 80%); Richard Payne, Informed Trade in Spot Foreign Exchange Markets: An Empiri-
cal Investigation, 61 J. INT’L ECON. 307, 321 (2003) (estimating the adverse selection 
component of the effective spread at 63%); Jian Yao, Spread Components and Dealer 
Profits in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market 28 (Nov. 2, 1997) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lyons/Yao%20 
FX%20dealer%20profits.pdf (estimating the adverse selection component of the effective 
spread for an average-sized transaction at 17%). 
132 See, e.g., Frank McGroarty et al., The Role of Private Information in Return Vola-
tility, Bid-Ask Spreads and Price Levels in the Foreign Exchange Market, 19 J. INT’L FIN. 
MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 387, 400 (2009) (concluding that “private information 
has no discernable effect on the bid-ask spread”); Carol Osler et al., Price Discovery in 
Currency Markets 12 (Sch. Econ. & Mgmt., Leibniz Universität Hannover, Discussion 
Paper No. 351, 2006), available at http://www.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/Forschung/Diskus 
sionspapiere/dp-351.pdf (suggesting that “adverse selection has little influence over 
customer spreads”). 
133 See Green, supra note 42, at 1213 tbl.III (analyzing over-the-counter transactions 
in U.S. government securities around economic announcements and estimating the ad-
verse selection component of the effective spread from 160 to 177%); Huang et al., supra 
note 43, at 288 tbl.III (analyzing over-the-counter transactions in U.S. government securi-
ties around macroeconomic announcements and estimating the adverse selection compo-
nent of the effective spread from 40 to 260%); Jianxin Wang, Asymmetric Information 
and the Bid-Ask Spread: An Empirical Comparison Between Automated Order Execution 
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questioned the magnitude of the adverse selection component.
134
 Finally, 
estimates for markets in basket- and index-based securities also range 
widely,
135
 and some of these studies questioned the applicable bid-ask 
                                                                                                                         
and Open Outcry Auction, 9 J. INT’L FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 115, 125 tbl.3 
(1999) (analyzing transactions in Australian government securities futures on the Sydney 
Futures Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component of the quoted spread, 
depending on the methodology and the trading platform, from 4 to 56%). 
134 See Mark D. Griffiths et al., Market-Making Costs in Treasury Bills: A Benchmark 
for the Cost of Liquidity, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2146, 2148 (2010) (analyzing over-the-
counter transactions in U.S. government securities and concluding that “dealers do not 
appear to price any asymmetric information risk at a time when the true value may be the 
most uncertain”). 
135 See Ahn et al., supra note 42, at 1118, 1131 (analyzing transactions in KOSPI 200 
equity index options on the Korea Exchange and estimating the adverse selection compo-
nent of the implied spread at 35% for call options and 39% for put options); Henk Berk-
man et al., A Note on Execution Costs for Stock Index Futures: Information Versus Li-
quidity Effects, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 565, 571 tbl.1, 573 tbl.2, 574 tbl.3 (2005) 
(analyzing transactions in FTSE100 equity index futures on the London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component 
of the effective spread at 18%); Patricia Chelley-Steeley & Keebong Park, The Adverse 
Selection Component of Exchange Traded Funds, 19 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 65, 71 
(2010) (analyzing transactions in index and industry-based exchange-traded funds on 
various trading venues and estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the 
methodology, at 0%, with many estimates being negative, of the effective spread and 
18% and 24% for index and industry-based funds, respectively, of the implied spread); 
Shantaram P. Hegde & John B. McDermott, The Market Liquidity of DIAMONDS, Q’s, 
and Their Underlying Stocks, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 1043, 1060 tbl.4, 1061 tbl.5 (2004) 
(analyzing transactions in exchange-traded funds comprised of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average stocks on the NYSE and estimating the adverse selection component, depending 
on the methodology, at 23% of the effective spread and 26% of the quoted spread); Yu 
Chuan Huang, The Components of Bid-Ask Spread and Their Determinants: TAIFEX 
Versus SGX-DT, 24 J. FUTURES MKTS. 835, 846 tbl.I, 855 tbl.VI (2004) (analyzing trans-
actions in Taiwan equity index futures on the Taiwan Futures Exchange and the Singa-
pore Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the metho-
dology and the spread metric used, from 42 to 61% for a floor-based trading platform and 
from 11 to 26% for an automated trading platform); Kim et al., supra note 130, at 194 
(analyzing transactions in Nikkei 225 equity index futures on the Singapore International 
Monetary Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component of the traded spread 
at 4%); Wang, supra note 133, at 125 tbl.3 (1999) (analyzing transactions in SPI equity 
index futures on the Sydney Futures Exchange and estimating the adverse selection 
component of the quoted spread, depending on the methodology and the trading platform, 
from 9 to 35%); Jonathan Clarke & Kuldeep Shastri, Adverse Selection Costs and 
Closed-End Funds 31 tbl.2 (Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=256728 (analyzing transactions in various closed-
end funds, including equity, bond, and municipal debt-focused funds, on the NYSE and 
estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the methodology, at 19% of 
the implied spread and 10% of the quoted spread). 
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spread decomposition methodology.
136
 While there are plausible explana-
tions for the magnitude of the adverse selection component, including 
reasons other than informational asymmetry,
137
 this dispersion of results is 
more difficult to explain. 
Overall, bid-ask spread decomposition studies appear unreliable at 
quantifying the impact of informed trading and, of course, insider trading 
more specifically. This observation may indicate either a host of methodo-
logical problems, leading to the question of whether estimates of the ad-
verse selection component are really “noise,”
138
 or difficulties with defin-
ing and isolating “informed trading.”
139
 
V. THE CONNECTION AMONG ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY OF 
INFORMED TRADING AND BID-ASK SPREADS AND THEIR COMPONENTS 
Another key area of research analyzes estimates of the probability of 
informed trading (PIN).
140
 Several of these studies appear to lend support 
                                                 
136 See Robert Neal & Simon M. Wheatley, Adverse Selection and Bid-Ask Spreads: 
Evidence from Closed-End Funds, 1 J. FIN. MKTS. 121, 128 tbl.1, 138, 139 tbl.5 (1998) 
(analyzing transactions in shares of closed-end equity-focused funds on the NYSE and 
the AMEX, estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the methodology, 
at 19% of the implied spread and 52% of the quoted spread, and questioning these esti-
mates because they are comparable to matched common stocks). 
137 See Ahn et al., supra note 42, at 1143 (arguing that the magnitude of the adverse 
selection component for equity index options markets “can be interpreted as evidence for 
informed trading based on public information”); Bjønnes & Rime, supra note 131, at 589 
(suggesting that the magnitude of the adverse selection component for foreign currency 
markets is explained by their higher liquidity and lower inventory and order processing 
costs); Green, supra note 42, at 1212–14 (arguing that the estimate of the adverse selec-
tion component for U.S. government securities markets exceeding 100% might be ex-
plained by dealers’ consumption of liquidity, informed trading based on public informa-
tion, unobserved customer trading, and the existence of the interdealer market and 
showing that the adverse selection component increases immediately after disclosure); 
Huang et al., supra note 43, at 273 (arguing that the magnitude of the adverse selection 
component for U.S. government securities markets “suggests trading based on superior 
inventory or order flow information”); see also Clarke & Shastri, supra note 135, at 25–
26 (pointing out that the adverse selection component for closed-end funds is still lower 
than for matched securities and portfolio components). 
138 For several critical studies leading to this conclusion, see sources in Dolgopolov, 
Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 162 n.436, 172 n.500. 
139 See id. at 179. 
140 This methodology for computing PIN estimates was pioneered in David Easley et 
al., Liquidity, Information, and Infrequently Traded Stocks, 51 J. FIN. 1405 (1996). Sev-
eral other studies used modified methodologies to obtain such estimates. See, e.g., Ekke-
hart Boehmer et al., Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading—Does Trade Mis-
classification Matter?, 10 J. FIN. MKTS. 26 (2007); David Jackson, Inferring Trader 
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to bid-ask spread decomposition studies by pointing to the positive corre-
lation between PIN estimates and the adverse selection component in 
equity markets,
141
 although one study found a “surprising negative correla-
tion” between PIN estimates and several measures of the adverse selection 
component for stocks on the NYSE.
142
 Other studies similarly pointed to 
the positive correlation between PIN estimates and bid-ask spreads in 
equity markets.
143
 Of course, the first approach is somewhat problematic 
because it links two econometric estimates rather than observed variables, 
while the second approach is more objective because bid-ask spreads are 
readily observable. 
There is some empirical evidence in favor of PIN that passes the “it 
makes sense” test,
144
 but several empirical studies are more difficult to 
                                                                                                                         
Behavior from Transaction Data: A Trade Count Model, 31 J. ECON. & FIN. 283 (2007); 
Qin Lei & Guojun Wu, Time-Varying Informed and Uninformed Trading Activities, 8 J. 
FIN. MKTS. 153 (2005); Ken Nyholm, Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading, 25 
J. FIN. RES. 485 (2002); Syed Walid Reza & Craig A. Wilson, Does Corporate Owner-
ship Impact the Probability of Informed Trading?, 7 INT’L J. BUS. RES. 188 (2007); 
Anthony Tay et al., Using High-Frequency Transaction Data to Estimate the Probability 
of Informed Trading, 7 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 288 (2009); David Easley et al., Flow 
Toxicity and Volatility in a High Frequency World (Cornell Univ., Johnson Sch. Re-
search Paper No. 09-2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695596; Yuxing 
Yan, A New Method to Estimate PIN (Probability of Informed Trading) (Mar. 17, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1361921. 
141 See, e.g., Kee H. Chung & Mingsheng Li, Adverse-Selection Costs and the Proba-
bility of Information-Based Trading, 38 FIN. REV. 257, 262, 270 (2003) (data from the 
NYSE); Joachim Grammig et al., Knowing Me, Knowing You: Trader Anonymity and 
Informed Trading in Parallel Markets, 4 J. FIN. MKTS. 385, 385, 408 (2001) (data from 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange); Jackson, supra note 140, at 294–95 (data from the 
NYSE); Elizabeth R. Odders-White & Mark J. Ready, Credit Ratings and Stock Liquidi-
ty, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 119, 131, 138 tbl.5 (2006) (data from the NYSE). 
142 Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 17–18. 
143 See, e.g., Paul Brockman & Dennis Y. Chung, Informed and Uninformed Trading 
in an Electronic, Order-Driven Environment, 35 FIN. REV. 125, 125, 145 (2000) (data 
from the HKSE); David Easley et al., Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Unin-
formed Trades, 6 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 171, 173, 179 (2008) (data from the NYSE); 
Hans G. Heidle & Robert D. Huang, Information-Based Trading in Dealer and Auction 
Markets: An Analysis of Exchange Listings, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 391, 
416–17 (2002) (data from the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ); Jackson, supra note 
140, at 294 (data from the NYSE); Lei & Wu, supra note 140, at 177 (data from the 
NYSE); Odders-White & Ready, supra note 141, at 138 tbl.5 (data from the NYSE); 
Clara Vega, Stock Price Reaction to Public and Private Information, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 
103, 128 (2006) (data from various trading venues). 
144 See, e.g., Stephen Brown & Stephen A. Hillegeist, How Disclosure Quality Affects 
the Level of Information Asymmetry, 12 REV. ACCT. STUD. 443, 444 (2007) (finding a 
negative correlation between the quality of disclosure and PIN estimates for stocks on 
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interpret.
145
 Another perspective is whether PIN is a meaningful concept 
that is priced in equity markets.
146
 Furthermore, there are doubts whether 
                                                                                                                         
various trading venues); Jinghan Cai et al., How Better Informed Are the Institutional 
Investors?, 106 ECON. LETTERS 234, 237 (2010) (finding that PIN estimates are signifi-
cantly higher for institutional trades compared to retail trades for stocks on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange); Juan J. Cruces & Enrique Kawamura, Insider Trading and Corporate 
Governance in Latin America, in INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE ACROSS LATIN AMERICA 85, 129 (Alberto Chong & Florencio 
López-de-Silanes eds., 2007) (finding increased PIN estimates before certain types of 
announcements for stocks on various trading venues); Vanthuan Nguyen et al., Inter-
Market Competition for Exchange Traded Funds, 31 J. ECON. & FIN. 251, 258 (2007) 
(finding that PIN estimates for exchange-traded funds on various trading venues are 
significantly lower compared to component securities); Hadiye Aslan et al., Firm Charac-
teristics and Informed Trading: Implications for Asset Pricing 14–15 (Sept. 1, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1334465 (finding reasonable correlations between PIN estimates and such variables as 
insider holdings, accounting accruals, volatility, and firm size for stocks on the NYSE 
and the AMEX). 
145 See, e.g., Nihat Aktas et al., The PIN Anomaly Around M&A Announcements, 10 J. 
FIN. MKTS. 169, 170–71, 189 (2007) (finding that PIN estimates decrease before M&A 
announcements and increase after such announcements for stocks on Euronext Paris); 
Evangelos Benos & Marek Jochec, Testing the PIN Variable 1 (Mar. 12, 2007) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.business.uiuc.edu/fin 
ance/phd/pdf/5299.pdf (finding that PIN estimates before earnings announcements are 
slightly lower than estimates after such announcements for stocks on the NYSE); Clarke 
& Shastri, supra note 135, at 16 (finding that non-municipal bond funds on the NYSE 
have PIN estimates comparable to individual stocks). 
146 See Laurence Copeland et al., Information-Based Trade in the Shanghai Stock 
Market, 20 GLOBAL FIN. J. 180, 180 (2009) (concluding that PIN is priced on the Shang-
hai Stock Exchange but finding that some of its effect is indistinguishable from the turn-
over effect); Malay K. Dey, Is Information Risk Really a Determinant of Security Re-
turns? Evidence from TORQ, J. TRADING, Summer 2010, at 51, 51 (concluding that PIN 
is not priced on the NYSE); Jefferson Duarte & Lance Young, Why Is PIN Priced?, 91 J. 
FIN. ECON. 119, 119 (2009) (concluding that PIN is priced on the NYSE and the AMEX 
to the extent it reflects illiquidity rather than informational asymmetry); David Easley et 
al., Factoring Information into Returns, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 293, 308 
(2010) (finding evidence consistent with the view that PIN is priced on the NYSE and the 
AMEX but also considering the possibility that PIN is a proxy for another underlying 
factor); David Easley et al., Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?, 57 J. 
FIN. 2185, 2218–19 (2002) (concluding that PIN is priced on the NYSE); Kathleen P. 
Fuller et al., Is Information Risk Priced for NASDAQ-Listed Stocks?, 34 REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 301, 310–11 (2010) (concluding that PIN is only weakly 
priced on NASDAQ and likely to be a proxy for other variables); Partha Mohanram & 
Shiva Rajgopal, Is PIN Priced Risk?, 47 J. ACCT. & ECON. 226, 241 (2009) (concluding 
that PIN is not priced on the NYSE and the AMEX); Y.C. Lu & Woon K. Wong, Proba-
bility of Information-Based Trading as a Pricing Factor in Taiwan Stock Market 16 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1115419 (concluding that PIN is priced on the Taiwan Stock Exchange). 
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PIN captures—or is highly sensitive to changes in—insider trading rather 
than informed trading that reflects inherent differences in acquiring, 
processing, and aggregating information, as well as other similar factors: 
PIN is likely to be most highly correlated with information asymme-
tries that exist between groups of outside investors rather than asymme-
tries that exist between insiders and outside investors. As a result, it is 
possible that PIN is computed mainly from observations of one kind of 
information asymmetry while insider trading is purely due to a second 
kind.147 
Another study linked a decrease in the tick size with higher PIN esti-
mates for stocks on the NYSE,
148
 which is also consistent with an increase 
in short-term informed trading.
149
 The skepticism that insider trading con-
stitutes the bulk of informed trading captured by PIN estimates is rein-
forced by the fact that such estimates for individual stocks often seem to 
be quite high, although several methodological approaches yield lower 
estimates.
150
 An additional consideration is the detection of relatively large 
PIN estimates in a variety of markets in assets other than equities or equity 
options.
151
 Furthermore, one study analyzed the “flash crash” of May 6, 
                                                 
147 Steven J. Huddart & Bin Ke, Information Asymmetry and Cross-Sectional Varia-
tion in Insider Trading, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 195, 219 (2007). 
148 Xin Zhao & Kee H. Chung, Decimal Pricing and Information-Based Trading: Tick 
Size and Informational Efficiency of Asset Price, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 753, 764 
(2006). 
149 See DURBIN, supra note 17, at 93–94. 
150 See, e.g., Brockman & Chung, supra note 143, at 132, 137 (a mean value of 33% 
for a sample of 532 stocks on the HKSE); Kee H. Chung et al., Order Preferencing, 
Adverse-Selection Costs, and the Probability of Information-Based Trading, 27 REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 343, 346, 353 tbl.3 (2006) (mean values of 27% and 30% 
for two different samples of 3032 and 2983 stocks on NASDAQ); Chung & Li, supra 
note 141, at 263 tbl.1 (a mean value of 14% for a sample of 538 stocks on the NYSE); 
Dey, supra note 146, at 53, 55 (a mean value of 21% for a sample of 65 stocks on the 
NYSE); Easley et al., supra note 143, at 179, 190 tbl.4 (a mean value of 14% for a sam-
ple of 16 stocks on the NYSE); Jackson, supra note 140, at 292 tbl.2 (mean values of 
19% and 23%, depending on the methodology, for a sample of 90 stocks on the NYSE); 
Lei & Wu, supra note 140, at 162, 165 tbl.2 (a mean value of 23% for a sample of 40 
stocks on the NYSE); Reza & Wilson, supra note 140, at 194, 208 tbl.12 (a mean value 
ranging from 9 to 11%, depending on the subsample, for a sample of 73 stocks on the 
NYSE and the AMEX); Yan, supra note 140, at 50 tbl.9 (mean values of 7% and 20%, 
depending on the methodology, for a sample of 90 stocks on the NYSE). 
151 See, e.g., Julien Idier & Stefano Nardelli, Probability of Informed Trading on the 
Euro Overnight Market Rate, 16 INT’L J. FIN. & ECON. 131, 139 (2011) (a mean value of 
45% for over-the-counter interest rate markets); Haitao Li et al., Are Liquidity and Infor-
mation Risks Priced in the Treasury Bond Market?, 64 J. FIN. 467, 484 tbl.III (2009) (a 
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2010, which was a system-wide phenomenon, and found that one of the 
PIN metrics for E-mini S&P 500 futures “was abnormally high at least one 
week before the flash crash [and] reached its highest level in the history of 
the E-mini S&P 500 [shortly before the crash].”
152
 
Another direction in empirical research specifically links PIN esti-
mates in equity markets and insider trading, although one of these studies 
explicitly recognized that PIN “provides estimates of privately informed 
trading, which is more general and not necessarily restricted to illegal 
insider trading.”
153
 Several studies examined correlations among PIN 
estimates and various corporate governance characteristics, such as CEO 
compensation, director ownership, the existence of an outside board chair-
person, and ownership concentration,
154
 with some of them having a 
plausible connection to insider trading. One study even tied higher scores 
for an index measuring the quality of corporate governance to lower PIN 
estimates on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ.
155
 It is, however, 
problematic to make any definite conclusions based on such imprecise 
proxies. This limitation is also relevant for a study that linked PIN esti-
                                                                                                                         
mean value of 26% for over-the-counter government securities markets); Clarke & Sha-
stri, supra note 135, at 31 tbl.2 (a mean value ranging from 15 to 19% for various equity- 
and debt-focused closed-end funds on the NYSE); Ramazan Gen ay et al., When Do 
Informed Traders Arrive in Foreign Exchange Markets? 13 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://economics.ca/2008/papers/0027.pdf 
(a mean value of 12% for over-the-counter foreign currency markets); Ian W. Marsh & 
Ceire O’Rourke, Customer Order Flow and Exchange Rate Movements: Is There Really 
Information Content? 18 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704944 (a mean value of 31% for over-the-counter 
foreign currency markets); Clara Vega & Jin (Ginger) Wu, Stock Market Microstructure 
Measures of Information Asymmetry Are Related to Marketwide Information 26 tbl.1A 
(Dec. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=951491 (a mean value ranging from 12 to 14%, depending on maturity, for 
over-the-counter government securities markets). 
152 David Easley et al., The Microstructure of the “Flash Crash”: Flow Toxicity, Li-
quidity Crashes, and the Probability of Informed Trading, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 
2011, at 118, 122. One researcher criticized this methodology and asserted that, “the flash 
crash reveals a key weakness of the PIN measure in that it overlooks the possibility of 
order imbalances induced by firm-specific or market-wide liquidity shocks.” Qin Lei, 
Unveiling the Identity of PIN from the Flash Crash: Illiquidity or Information Asymme-
try? 1, 14 (Aug. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697879. 
153 Cruces & Kawamura, supra note 144, at 128. 
154 See id. at 108–13 (data from various trading venues); David Jackson et al., Corpo-
rate Governance and Informed Trading, 4 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 295, 308 tbl.II 
(2008) (data from the Toronto Stock Exchange). 
155 Kee H. Chung et al., Corporate Governance and Liquidity, 45 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 265, 265 (2010). 
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mates on the NYSE and the AMEX and various firm-specific financial 
indicators and ratios, and concluded that such estimates are most influ-
enced by asset turnover and dividend yields.
156
 One contribution found no 
correlation between PIN estimates on the NYSE and insiders’ registered 
transactions and argued that this result “casts some doubt on the validity of 
[the PIN] measure.”
157
 By contrast, another study pointed to a positive 
correlation between PIN estimates on the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
NASDAQ, and the percentage of insider ownership.
158
 
A different approach to linking insider trading and PIN estimates in 
equity markets focuses on regulation. One cross-country study examined 
key features of insider trading regulation and found negative correlations 
among PIN estimates and the maximum incarceration sentence allowed by 
law and the potential strength of pecuniary sanctions.
159
 However, it failed 
to identify any significant correlations with respect to the existence of 
potential criminal sanctions, the actual existence of civil and criminal 
enforcement, the strength of the public regulator, and the availability of 
private right of action.
160
 Another contribution evaluated the impact of a 
piece of legislation in New Zealand that had implemented a continuous 
disclosure regime, established a powerful regulatory agency to oversee 
securities markets and enforce insider trading restrictions, and required 
insiders to disclose their transactions within five trading days, but this 
extensive regulatory framework was found to have no significant effect on 
PIN estimates.
161
 A related study examined PIN estimates on the weakly 
regulated Prague Stock Exchange and concluded that their mean values 
ranged from 0 to 2%, depending on the subsample, and thus were much 
lower compared to more regulated markets, although this counterintuitive 
result could be justified by the specifics of the trading mechanism and the 
existence of off-exchange informed transactions.
162
 By contrast, a later 
                                                 
156 Chuan Liao et al., Firm Characteristics and Information Risk, JASSA, no. 2, 2010, 
at 41, 43, 46–47. 
157 Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 23. 
158 Patrick J. Dennis & James P. Weston, Who’s Informed?: An Analysis of Stock 
Ownership and Informed Trading 2–3 (Sept. 25, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
159 Bart Frijns et al., Elements of Effective Insider Trading Laws 8, 35 tbl.6 (n.d.) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.fma.org/Texas 
/Papers/ElementsInsiderTrading.pdf. 
160 Id. at 8–9, 35 tbl.6, 37 tbl.7. 
161 Russell Poskitt & Peihong Yang, The Impact of Disclosure Reform on Information 
Risk in NZX-Listed Stocks, 18 PAC. ACCT. REV. 47, 47, 50–51 (2006). 
162 Libor N!me"ek, Liquidity and Information-Based Trading on the Order Driven 
Capital Market: The Case of the Prague Stock Exchange 16–17 (Aug. 25, 1997) (unpub-
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study of the same trading venue found that the mean value of PIN esti-
mates is 32%, which is at least as large as in more regulated markets.
163
 
An additional study analyzed PIN estimates for companies in Latin Amer-
ica, a region in which “illegal insider trading goes unpunished,”
164
 but the 
median estimates of 11% for the most liquid stocks and 20% for the least 
liquid stocks are comparable to more regulated markets.
165
 A similar in-
vestigation focused on PIN estimates in Chinese securities markets, in 
which insider trading is also common and weakly controlled,
166
 but the 
obtained mean value of 21% is similarly comparable to more regulated 
markets.
167
 Yet another China-focused study calculated mean PIN esti-
mates for institutional and individual trades at 24% and 17%, respective-
ly.
168
 One potential explanation for the seeming irrelevance of regulation 
is that insider trading is only a small part of informed trading captured by 
PIN estimates. 
Overall, the totality of the existing empirical research suggests that the 
PIN-related studies do not offer clear and consistent evidence to link in-
formed trading and market liquidity because of a variety of conceptual, 
methodological, and measurement problems. The link between PIN esti-
mates and insider trading is also suspect. 
VI. VARIOUS MECHANISMS FOR PROVIDING LIQUIDITY 
A separate area of research on the link between informed trading and 
market liquidity pertains to the impact of various mechanisms for provid-
ing liquidity. One common approach is to compare bid-ask spreads and 
their components for similar equity securities on dealer and auction mar-
kets, typically the NYSE and NASDAQ.
169
 Although several theoretical 
approaches predict why market makers on a certain trading venue might 
be more vulnerable to informed trading, actual results of empirical re-
                                                                                                                         
lished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/pdf/wp 
/Wp117.pdf. 
163 Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera, Information-Driven Trading at the Prague 
Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra-Day Data, 10 ECON. TRANSITION 747, 758 (2002). 
164 Cruces & Kawamura, supra note 144, at 128. 
165 See id. at 128–29. 
166 Weihua Zhu, Corporate Governance and Insider Trading Regulation Efficiency, 4 
FRONTIERS BUS. RES. CHINA 306, 307 (2010). 
167 See id. at 313 tbl.1. 
168 Cai, supra note 144, at 237. 
169 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 122–25 
& nn.193–206. 
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search have not yielded a consistent answer.
170
 Recent comparative studies 
indicate that the adverse selection component is higher for the NYSE than 
for NASDAQ, although the magnitude of the inter-market difference va-
ries across these studies.
171
 Furthermore, one must take into account the 
rapid evolution of both types of markets and their convergence, as well as 
possible systemic differences in other components of bid-ask spreads. 
Another direction in empirical research examines the introduction of 
designated market makers in equity markets, which often have exchange-
granted incentives to provide liquidity. Several studies concluded that the 
introduction of such market participants had decreased bid-ask spreads 
without an impact on the adverse selection component in absolute terms 
on Euronext Amsterdam
172
 and Xetra.
173
 If the existence of designated 
market makers aids the detection of informed trading,
174
 these results look 
puzzling, although technological and other market structure changes must 
be taken into account. A different study analyzed the introduction of des-
ignated market makers on the Italian Stock Exchange and found lower 
bid-ask spreads and adverse selection costs, as well as lower volatility.
175
 
However, such market makers had undertaken the obligation to function 
as de facto securities analysts,
176
 and the study ultimately concluded that 
“the decrease in information asymmetries observed ... is due to an im-
provement in the degree of information disclosure.”
177
 
Yet another angle is the examination of trading venues without formal 
market makers, such as markets that function as open limit order books or 
                                                 
170 Id. 
171 See Charkavarty et al., supra note 88, at 1071–73 tbl.2; Jiang et al., supra note 
107, at 208 tbl.3; Serednyakov, supra note 99, at 45 tbl.IX. 
172 Albert J. Menkveld & Ting Wang, How Do Designated Market Makers Create 
Value for Small-Caps? 31–33 (Jan. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890526. 
173 Inga van den Bongard & Jördis Klar, Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread and the 
Role of Designated Sponsors: Evidence for Xetra 22–23 (Oct. 5, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.socialpolitik.de/tagungshps 
/2007/paper/Klar.pdf; Jördis Hengelbrock, Designated Sponsors and Bid-Ask Spreads on 
Xetra 23–24 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1046961. 
174 For a discussion of this proposition in the context of the specialist system in auc-
tion markets, see Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 
122–23 & nn.193–95 & 198–200. 
175 Pietro Perotti & Barbara Rindi, Market Makers as Information Providers: The 
Natural Experiment of STAR, 17 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 895, 914–15 (2010). 
176 Id. at 897, 915. 
177 Id. at 915. 
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aggregate market and limit orders.
178
 This model, which has a long histo-
ry,
179
 is acquiring importance even outside of equity markets.
180
 Although 
the existence of de facto market makers without specific exchange-granted 
advantages is not necessarily precluded for such trading venues,
181
 there 
might be industry norms or regulatory restrictions to that effect.
182
 Even 
putting aside the existence of de facto market makers, one formal model 
concluded that bid-ask spreads in an open limit order book market should 
reflect the cost of informed trading.
183
 However, it is debatable whether 
the risk of trading with a better-informed counterparty is of real signific-
ance to a random trader compared to a trader regularly transacting in both 
directions.
184
 Several empirical studies analyzed the magnitude of the 
                                                 
178 The vision of trading venues without the pivotal importance of traditional market 
makers was clearly articulated in Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Ex-
change (pts. 1 & 2), FIN. ANALYSTS J., July–Aug. 1971, at 28, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–
Dec. 1971, at 24. For a later analysis of this issue by the same author, see Fischer Black, 
Equilibrium Exchanges, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1995, at 23. 
179 For instance, a commission formed to study the LSE recommended back in 1878 
that “a book or register should be kept ... in which brokers should be invited to enter from 
time to time the names and quantities of [certain illiquid] securities ... which they may 
have instructions to buy or sell, with or without a price at which they are willing to 
deal.... [thus achieving] the exclusion of the middleman.” LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, 1878, [C. (2d series)] 2157, at 10. 
180 See, e.g., ANDY NYBO, TABB GRP., TRYING TO MAKE CHANGE: MARKET MAKERS 
AND THE EVOLVING OPTIONS MARKET 1 (2008) (“Slowly but surely, options trading is 
transitioning from a quote-driven market where liquidity is provided by market makers, 
to an order-driven market with liquidity being provided by natural market participants.”). 
181 See, e.g., Brockman & Chung, supra note 143, at 128 (“Although there are no 
market makers with an affirmative obligation to trade in an order-driven environment, de 
facto market makers on the [HKSE, an open limit order book market] are likely to pro-
vide liquidity in much the same fashion as ‘scalpers’ on floor-based futures exchanges.”). 
182 See, e.g., G.-F. Gu et al., Quantifying Bid-Ask Spreads in the Chinese Stock Market 
Using Limit-Order Book Data, 57 EUR. PHYSICS J. B 81, 82 (2007) (“In order to reduce 
the market risks and speculation actions, the Chinese stock market adopts t+1 trading 
system, which does not allow traders to sell the stocks bought on the same day ....”); 
Yasushi Hamao & Joel Hasbrouck, Securities Trading in the Absence of Dealers: Trades 
and Quotes on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 8 REV. FIN. STUD. 849, 850 (1995) (“[B]y 
custom and convention, members [of the Tokyo Stock Exchange] refrain from placing 
proprietary limit orders on both sides of the market.... [which] effectively prevents a 
group of traders that would naturally gravitate toward functioning as de facto dealers 
from doing so.”). 
183 Lawrence G. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, 49 J. 
FIN. 1127, 1140 (1994). 
184 Some evidence on this issue is presented by empirical research finding a negative 
correlation between bid-ask spreads in equity markets and disclosure quality for trading 
venues without formal market makers. See Andrea Maria Accioly Fonseca Minardi et al., 
Bid-Ask Spreads in a Stock Exchange Without Market Specialists, 7 LATIN AM. BUS. 
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adverse selection component for stocks on trading venues without formal 
market makers and found this component to be relatively large.
185
 Another 
study argued that “the price impact measure and the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread” for stocks in the open limit order book 
markets in China “explain[] 44% and 46% of the variation in [foreign-held 
equity] discounts.”
186
 These results may seem surprising, but the ambigui-
ties of the definition of “informed trading” and other limitations of bid-ask 
spread decomposition methodologies must be taken into account. 
                                                                                                                         
REV. 19, 33–34 (2006) (data from the São Paulo Stock Exchange); Frino & Jones, supra 
note 65, at 1393 (data from the Australian Stock Exchange); Zhou, supra note 65, at 615–
16 (data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange). It is 
debatable whether this phenomenon can be attributed—at least partially—to inventory 
holding costs rather than adverse selection costs for trading venues in which even de 
facto market makers do not exist. Compare Chengying He et al., Adverse Selection Costs: 
A Study on the Chinese Stock Market, 4 FRONTIERS BUS. RES. CHINA 209, 222 (2010) 
(“[A]n investor who submitted limit orders acts as an implied market maker .... [T]he 
theory of inventory holding costs can be used in order-driven market, based on the view 
that limited orders absorb the inventory passively according to the instructions (orders) 
from the market in exchange for price reverse.”) (citation omitted), with Zhou, supra note 
65, at 591 n.12 (“[T]here is no requirement for dealers to hold a certain level of inventory 
to meet demand immediately, and hence, no inventory holding cost in an order-driven 
market.”). 
185 Hee-Joon Ahn et al., The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread in a Limit-Order 
Market: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 9 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 399, 411, 412 
tbl.4 (2002) (estimating the adverse selection component of the implied spread on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, a trading venue that aggregates market and limit orders, from 45 
to 57%, depending on the share price); Paul Brockman & Dennis Y. Chung, Bid-Ask 
Spread Components in an Order-Driven Environment, 22 J. FIN. RES. 227, 237–40 
(1999) (estimating the adverse selection component of the effective spread on the HKSE, 
a limit order book, at 33%); Frank de Jong et al., Price Effects of Trading and Compo-
nents of the Bid-Ask Spread on the Paris Bourse, 3 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 193, 200–01 (1996) 
(estimating the adverse selection component of the effective spread on the Paris Bourse, a 
trading venue that aggregates market and limit orders, from 30 to 45%, depending on the 
trade size); He et al., supra note 184, at 219–20 tbl.3 (estimating the adverse selection 
component of the effective spread on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, an open limit order 
book, from 2 to 43% of the effective spread, depending on the bid-ask spread decomposi-
tion methodology, firm size, and order size); Zhou, supra note 65, at 600 tbl.3 (estimating 
the adverse selection component of the effective spread on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, open limit order books, at 37%). None of these stu-
dies isolated the inventory holding component, and one of them explicitly recognized this 
methodological limitation. He et al., supra note 184, at 228–29. From the measurement 
perspective, it is argued that, “there is no essential difference between effective spread 
and quoted spread in order-driven markets.” Zhou, supra note 65, at 593 n.14. 
186 Kalok Chan et al., Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the 
China Foreign Share Discount, 63 J. FIN. 159, 159 (2008). 
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VII. THE EXAMINATION OF UNREGULATED SECURITIES MARKETS 
AND THE IMPACT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION ON MARKET 
LIQUIDITY 
Another avenue for examining the link between informed trading and 
bid-ask spreads includes historical experiences of unregulated securities 
markets and the impact of insider trading regulation, including various 
cross-country studies. However, one methodological complication is that 
many studies are not easily comparable. 
A separate category of research brings together studies of historical 
experiences of unregulated securities markets—although there is little 
direct evidence that insider trading was of concern to equity market mak-
ers and thus had an adverse impact on market liquidity. One study ana-
lyzed stocks on the Berlin Stock Exchange in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and concluded that, in this active securities market, 
“trading costs were low ... in the decades before World War I, even by 
modern US standards and certainly by recent German standards.”
187
 Puz-
zled by this result, the study hypothesized that “the Berlin banks may have 
intervened in price determination as informed market makers and thereby 
reduced adverse selection costs.”
188
 A related study of the NYSE argued 
that the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads for a representa-
tive sample of common stocks increased from 49% in 1900 to 69% in 
1910 in relative terms, corresponding to a 114% increase in absolute 
terms.
189
 However, there were improvements in other measures of market 
liquidity during the same time period,
190
 and the estimates of the adverse 
selection component displayed several inconsistencies when broken down 
by subgroups.
191
 The study also concluded that “trading costs and meas-
ures of illiquidity for the most heavily traded securities compare quite 
                                                 
187 Thomas Gehrig & Caroline Fohlin, Trading Costs in Early Securities Markets: The 
Case of the Berlin Stock Exchange 1880–1910, 10 REV. FIN. 587, 589–90 (2006). Anoth-
er study also came to a similar conclusion, but it still argued that “[l]iquidity was nega-
tively correlated with active informed trading.” Carsten Burhop & Sergey Gelman, Li-
quidity Measures, Liquidity Drivers and Expected Returns on an Early Call Auction 
Market 1 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint No. 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2011_19online.pdf. 
188 Gehrig & Fohlin, supra note 187, at 610. 
189 Caroline Fohlin et al., Liquidity and Competition in Unregulated Markets: The 
New York Stock Exchange Before the SEC 1, 45 tbl.4 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author), available at http://www.iga.ucdavis.edu/Research/All-UC 
/conferences/spring-2010/Fohlin%20paper.PDF. 
190 Id. at 19–20. 
191 See id. at 23–24, 45 tbl.4. 
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closely with modern-day rates in well-developed markets”
192
—despite the 
lack of insider trading regulation.
193
 
A different category of empirical research consists of studies of mod-
ern securities markets that lack regulatory norms or stringent enforcement. 
One study focused on the Prague Stock Exchange, a market in which in-
sider trading is common.
194
 This study concluded that the adverse selec-
tion component of the effective spread for stocks averages at 17%, which 
is quite low compared to more regulated markets.
195
 A study of the Ukrai-
nian stock market during the time period when this trading venue had no 
formal market makers estimated the adverse selection component of the 
traded spread at 10%
196
—despite the industry opinion that “insider trading 
is unfortunately a permanent feature of the Ukrainian stock market.”
197
 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the adverse selection component was statis-
tically insignificant for 50% of stocks in the sample, although this result 
might have been caused by the data’s insufficiency.
198
 One justification 
for the results produced by these two studies could be that more regulated 
markets possess more developed financial infrastructure, which may mean 
greater amounts of other types of informed trading. 
Another direction in empirical research studies the impact of insider 
trading regulation on liquidity of equity markets. One contribution focused 
on the two key laws aimed at insider trading in the United States and do-
cumented that they were associated with a decrease in bid-ask spreads on 
NASDAQ, but their impact on the adverse selection component was am-
biguous.
199
 One more U.S.-centered study found a decrease in bid-ask 
spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms 
on various trading venues after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
                                                 
192 Id. at 32. 
193 See id. at 4 (noting “the absence of regulation regarding insider trading” during the 
applicable time period). 
194 Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera, Informed Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: 
Evidence from an Emerging Market, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 275 (2003). 
195 Id. at 295. 
196 Yuriy Ryzhkov, Bid-Ask Spread Components: Evidence from PFTS (First Ukrai-
nian Trading System) 29 (2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, National University of “Kyiv-
Mohyla Academy”) (on file with author), available at http://www.kse.org.ua/uploads/file 
/library/2007/ryzhkov_2007.pdf. This study also found “almost no econometric evidence 
of inventory holding costs.” Id. at 26. 
197 Id. at 11. 
198 Id. at 27. 
199 Vaughn S. Armstrong, The Microstructure of Informed Trading: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading Sanctions iii, 135–36, 159 (May 1995) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with author). 
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related regulation.
200
 Another study analyzed the impact of an omnibus 
securities law passed in New Zealand that had several insider trading-
related provisions and concluded that this law had no impact on the ad-
verse selection component in either relative or absolute terms.
201
 By con-
trast, a study examining the impact of the same piece of legislation found 
smaller bid-ask spreads,
202
 although the implementation of a continuous 
disclosure regime
203
 might be responsible for this result. A different analy-
sis of this piece of legislation found a decrease in bid-ask spreads and the 
adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms.
204
 
An additional case study considers the impact of Regulation Fair Dis-
closure (Reg FD) that banned selective disclosure of certain types of in-
formation to favored investors and securities analysts.
205
 Empirical studies 
present evidence—often from different data sets—consistent with a range 
of views about the effectiveness and the overall effect of Reg FD, which 
could have impacted bid-ask spreads and their components in a variety of 
ways. For example, there is a debate whether this regulation has achieved 
its ultimate objectives,
206
 and some recent anecdotal evidence suggests 
                                                 
200 Pankaj K. Jain et al., Trends and Determinants of Market Liquidity in the Pre- and 
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203 See Poskitt & Yang, supra note 161, at 50. 
204 Bart Frijns et al., Insider Trading, Regulation, and the Components of the Bid-Ask 
Spread, 31 J. FIN. RES. 225, 225, 232, 233 tbl.1 (2008). 
205 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Ex-
change Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243). 
206 See Anwer S. Ahmed & Richard A. Schneible Jr., The Impact of Regulation Fair 
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Changes in Trading Volume and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements, 13 J. 
CORP. FIN. 282, 297 (2007) (“[Reg] FD succeeded in eliminating selective disclosure [for 
firms on various trading venues].”); Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana et al., The Impact of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analy-
sis, 39 FIN. REV. 549, 552 (2004) (“[T]he [post-Reg FD] decline in information asymme-
try in the pre-announcement period [for firms on the NYSE] is closely associated with 
lower institutional trading.”); Charles D. Collver, Is There Less Informed Trading After 
Regulation Fair Disclosure?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 270, 279 (2007) (“[I]nformed trading 
declined after implementation of Reg FD [on the NYSE], but ... this decline is not due to 
Reg FD.”); Andreas Gintschel & Stanimir Markov, The Effectiveness of Regulation FD, 
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that Reg FD has merely shifted, rather than eliminated, at least some part 
of insider trading activities.
207
 Other aspects of empirical research focus 
on the impact of this regulation—often with different conclusions—on the 
informational environment,
208
 volatility,
209
 and cost of capital
210
 as a 
                                                                                                                         
37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 293, 312–13 (2004) (“Reg FD achiev[ed] its immediate goal of 
curtailing the flow of private information from managers to financial analysts.... [as 
measured by] the price impact of analyst announcements in the post-Reg FD period [for 
firms on various trading venues] ....”); Bin Ke et al., The Effect of Regulation FD on 
Transient Institutional Investors’ Trading Behavior, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 853, 853 (2008) 
(“Reg FD has had an impact on management’s selective disclosure behavior and signifi-
cantly changed the trading behavior of transient institutions [on various trading ve-
nues].”); Robert B. Mendelson et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and Volatility: An 
Intraday Analysis, J. INVESTMENT MGMT., 3d Q. 2005, at 31, 32 (“Reg FD has been 
successful in its goal of reducing information asymmetry in the market [as measured by 
various variables, such as volatility, share volume, number of transactions, bid-ask 
spreads, and average trade size on the NYSE].”). 
207 See Gregory Zuckerman & Susan Pulliam, The Insider-Trading Case: How an 
SEC Crackdown Led to Rise of ‘Expert Networks,’ WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010, at C1. 
208 See Ahmed & Schneible, supra note 206, at 297 (“[Reg FD resulted in] a decrease 
in the average quality of information [about small and high-tech firms on various trading 
venues] ....”); Brian J. Bushee et al., Managerial and Investor Responses to Disclosure 
Regulation: The Case of Reg FD and Conference Calls, 79 ACCT. REV. 617, 617 (2004) 
(“[There seems to be no] evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information 
disclosed during the call period [for firms on various trading venues] ....”); Afshad J. 
Irani & Irene Karamanou, Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst 
Forecast Dispersion, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 15, 15 (2003) (“[Reg FD is associated with] a 
decrease in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion [for firms on various 
trading venues] ....”); Seung-Woog (Austin) Kwag & Kenneth Small, The Impact of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure on Earnings Management and Analyst Forecast Bias, 31 J. 
ECON. & FIN. 87, 97 (2007) (“[A]nalyst forecast accuracy has deteriorated in the post-FD 
period.... [and] analysts tend, on average, to overestimate earnings more in the post-FD 
period [for firms on various trading venues].”); Yan Sun, How Does Regulation Fair 
Disclosure Affect Pre-Fair Disclosure Selective Disclosers?, 24 J. ACCT. AUDITING & 
FIN. 59, 61 (2009) (“Reg FD is associated with a deterioration in the information envi-
ronment for firms [on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ] that relied on selective 
disclosures before the passage of the regulation [as measured by various variables, such 
as analyst following, analysts’ forecast error and dispersion, and informational efficiency 
of stock prices].”); Carla Carnaghan & Ranjini Sivakumar, The Effects of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure on Management Forecasts, at i (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=492662 (“[I]nformation disclosed by man-
agers has improved in terms of frequency, specificity and verifiable information provided 
[for firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ].”). 
209 See Warren Bailey et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and Earnings Information: 
Market, Analyst, and Corporate Responses, 58 J. FIN. 2487, 2511 (2003) (finding no 
change in volatility for firms on various trading venues); Bushee et al., supra note 208, at 
617 (finding increased volatility for firms on various trading venues); Alberto 
Dell’Acqua et al., Conference Calls and Stock Price Volatility in the Post-Reg FD Era, 
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proxy for risk, and these factors also influence market makers’ inventory 
holding costs.
211
 To turn to the link between regulation and liquidity of 
equity markets, several studies documented a decrease in bid-ask spreads 
for a number of trading venues after the passage of Reg FD,
212
 although 
another contribution found increased bid-ask spreads on the NYSE, the 
AMEX, and NASDAQ.
213
 A group of studies concluded that the adverse 
selection component decreased in both relative and absolute terms for 
stocks on the NYSE after the regulatory change,
214
 which is consistent 
with its effectiveness if the applicable bid-ask spread decomposition me-
thodology is accurate. By contrast, another contribution found that the 
adverse selection component substantially increased in both relative and 
absolute terms for stocks on NASDAQ post-Reg FD, while bid-ask 
                                                                                                                         
16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 256, 268–69 (2010) (finding lower volatility for high-tech firms on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ); Jennifer Francis et al., Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation 
Fair Disclosure Using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks, 41 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 271, 281–82 (2006) (finding lower volatility for firms on various trading 
venues, but not relative to foreign firms exempt from Reg FD); Chun I. Lee et al., Effect 
of Regulation FD on Asymmetric Information, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 2004, at 79, 
79 (finding “no significant increase in volatility” for firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
NASDAQ); Mendelson et al., supra note 206, at 31 (finding lower volatility for firms on 
the NYSE); Carnaghan & Sivakumar, supra note 208, at 22 (finding no increase in vola-
tility for firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ); see also Dana Hobson, Effects 
of Regulation and Technology on U.S. Stocks: Evidence from Earnings Announcements, 
J. TRADING, Spring 2007, at 89, 93 (“The changes brought about by Reg FD and Sar-
banes-Oxley led to a doubling of volatility in response to EPS [earnings per share] an-
nouncements [for firms on different trading venues].”). 
210 See Zhihong Chen et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capi-
tal, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 106, 139 (2010) (“[T]he cost of capital decreases significantly 
for a broad cross-section of US firms [on various trading venues] in the post-Reg FD 
period relative to the pre-Reg FD period.... [compared to foreign firms] which are exempt 
from Reg FD.”); Armando Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, 
and the Cost of Capital, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 300, 330 (2007) (“[S]mall firms [on the NYSE 
and NASDAQ] were adversely affected by Reg FD; their cost of capital rose.”). 
211 See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 133 & 
n.246, 172–73 & nn.501–03 (discussing the impact of volatility and risk on market mak-
ers’ inventory holding costs). 
212 Chiyachantana et al., supra note 206, at 552 (data from the NYSE); Venkat R. 
Eleswarapu et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Informa-
tion Asymmetry, 39 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 209, 223 (2004) (data from the NYSE); 
Mendelson et al., supra note 206, at 31 (data from the NYSE); Carnaghan & Sivakumar, 
supra note 208, at 22 (data from the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ). 
213 Lee et al., supra note 209, at 87. 
214 Chiyachantana et al., supra note 206, at 552; Eleswarapu et al., supra note 212, at 
210. 
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spreads decreased,
215
 which raises doubts about the effectiveness of this 
regulatory measure or the accuracy of the bid-ask spread decomposition 
methodology. Yet another study found that the adverse selection compo-
nent stayed the same in absolute terms and decreased in relative terms for 
stocks on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ post-Reg FD.
216
 
Several cross-country studies analyzed the impact of insider trading 
regulation on bid-ask spreads and their components and market depths in 
equity markets, while another approach linked such regulation and other 
measures of market liquidity.
217
 One study examined the world’s leading 
stock exchanges and concluded that the enforcement of insider trading 
regulation is associated with lower bid-ask spreads.
218
 A study of Ameri-
can Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded on the NYSE indicated that the 
link between the enforcement of insider trading laws and bid-ask spreads 
is statistically insignificant,
219
 while a later study of a similar sample of 
ADRs traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ concluded that such enforce-
ment is associated with narrower bid-ask spreads, greater market depths, 
and smaller adverse selection costs.
220
 Another contribution examined the 
impact of key features of insider trading regulation on bid-ask spreads and 
different estimates of the adverse selection component.
221
 This analysis 
has yielded a number of correlations with different levels of significance, 
with some of them supporting the link between regulation and greater 
market liquidity, but no significant correlations were detected among any 
                                                 
215 Baljit Sidhu et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection, 
46 J. ACCT. RES. 697, 697, 707, 715–16 (2008). 
216 Lee et al., supra note 209, at 86. 
217 See, e.g., Beny, supra note 5, at 264, 280 (stock market turnover, defined as “the 
ratio of the total value traded to total stock market capitalization”); Hazem Daouk et al., 
Capital Market Governance: How Do Security Laws Affect Market Performance?, 12 J. 
CORP. FIN. 560, 560, 562 (2006) (trading volume, defined as “[t]he ratio of dollar traded 
per month to the dollar market capitalization at the end of the month,” and market depth, 
defined as “[t]he ratio of trading volume to the standard deviation of daily returns (or the 
absolute value of monthly return) computed each month”); Thomas Lagoarde-Segot, 
Financial Reforms and Time-Varying Microstructures in Emerging Equity Markets, 33 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1755, 1761, 1769 (2009) (illiquidity, defined as “the variation in asset 
prices per unit of trading volume”). 
218 Pankaj Jain, Improving Liquidity Through Efficient Stock Market Structure and 
Operational Design, J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION, Nov. 2006, at 151, 159. 
219 Venkat R. Eleswarapu & Kumar Venkataraman, The Impact of Legal and Political 
Institutions on Equity Trading Costs: A Cross-Country Analysis, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1081, 1084 (2006). 
220 Kee H. Chung & Hao Zhang, Insider Trading Regulation and Market Quality: 
Evidence from American Depositary Receipts, 39 ASIA-PAC. J. FIN. STUD. 340, 342 
(2010). 
221 Frijns et al., supra note 159. 
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of these measures of liquidity and such important features as the actual 
existence of criminal enforcement and the strength of the public regula-
tor.
222
 A different study considered the impact of insider trading regulation 
in France and the United Kingdom and found a decrease in bid-ask 
spreads only in the former nation, attributing this result to the consistency 
of enforcement.
223
 Yet another study found that the existence of certain 
“insider trading” exchange-mandated rules lowers bid-ask spreads, but 
such rules relate to the conduct of securities market professionals, such as 
front-running, trading ahead of research reports, affiliation, and intimida-
tion/coordination, rather than the conduct of true insiders.
224
 
VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
A further key area of research considers various firm characteristics 
that relate to information asymmetry and informed trading in order to test 
their impact on liquidity of equity markets and adverse selection costs. 
One study analyzed various characteristics, such as volatility, volume, 
leverage, institutional ownership, security analyst activities, book-to-
market ratios, the importance of intangible assets, and R&D expenses, and 
concluded that 
most of the variables that measure information asymmetries [on the 
NYSE] are not related to adverse selection. The informed trader proxies 
have some impact on adverse selection, but the impact is not uniform 
across the [bid-ask spread decomposition] models. No single model ap-
pears to perform significantly better than the others.225 
Another study of the NYSE focused on similar variables, such as R&D 
expenses, the importance of physical assets, firm age, and insiders’ trans-
actions, and asserted that “estimates of adverse selection costs ... are re-
lated to firm characteristics that ex ante should be associated with infor-
mation asymmetry,”
226
 although the overall results appear to be 
ambiguous.
227
 The same study also looked at other variables, such as 
book-to-market ratios, P/E ratios, and security analyst forecasts, and found 
                                                 
222 Id. at 8–9, 36–37 tbl.7. 
223 Olivier Maisondieu-Laforge, Informed Trading and the Consistent Enforcement 
Hypothesis: Evidence from Bid-Ask Spreads in France and Britain, 17 GLOBAL FIN. J. 
439, 439 (2007). 
224 Douglas Cumming et al., Exchange Trading Rules and Stock Market Liquidity, 99 
J. FIN. ECON. 651, 656 tbl.1, 668 & tbl.6 (2011). 
225 Van Ness et al., supra note 73, at 95. 
226 Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 23. 
227 See id. at 20–23, 43–44 tbl.3. 
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“only weak evidence to suggest that the [adverse selection] measures are 
related to [these] proxies for a firm’s investment opportunity set.”
228
 
One contribution analyzed the impact of corporate governance—by us-
ing an index and its components, such as management discipline, transpa-
rency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social 
awareness—on the adverse selection component for stocks on the Singa-
pore Exchange and concluded that “higher quality corporate governance 
lowers the adverse selection component.”
229
 Another study analyzed 
stocks on the NYSE and the AMEX and found “that changes in bid-ask 
spreads at the time of earnings announcements are significantly negatively 
related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock 
holdings of directors and officers [and] that depth changes are significant-
ly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors’ and 
officers’ percentage stock holdings.”
230
 But the same study stated that “[a] 
sizable body of prior research indicates that boards that do a more effec-
tive job of monitoring management enhance the quality and the frequency 
of information released by management,”
231
 which suggests that this effect 
on market liquidity may be at least partially attributed to a channel other 
than informed trading. By contrast, another contribution found no evi-
dence that insider holdings have an impact on adverse selection costs for 
stocks on various trading venues and argued that different dimensions of 
liquidity are affected by the institutional ownership level and its concen-
tration,
232
 which may be attributed to informed trading other than insider 
trading. Yet another study found a correlation between the greater percen-
tage of equity held by the largest institutional investor, as opposed to the 
second largest institutional investor or all other institutional investors 
combined, and bid-ask spreads for stocks on NASDAQ.
233
 
Another study maintained that the magnitude of retail shareholdings is 
associated with smaller bid-ask spreads for stocks on the Australian Stock 
Exchange and hypothesized that “retail participation, in conjunction with 
measures to increase shareholder numbers, may assist to reduce the proba-
                                                 
228 Id. at 25. 
229 Charlie Charoenwong et al., Adverse Selection and Corporate Governance, 20 
INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 406, 412, 418 (2011). 
230 Kiridaran Kanagaretnam et al., Does Good Corporate Governance Reduce Infor-
mation Asymmetry Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements?, 26 J. ACCT. & PUB. 
POL’Y 497, 498 (2007). 
231 Id. (citation omitted). 
232 Amir Rubin, Ownership Level, Ownership Concentration and Liquidity, 10 J. FIN. 
MKTS. 219, 245 (2007). 
233 Karen Schnatterly et al., Informational Advantages of Large Institutional Owners, 
29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 219, 225–26 (2008). 
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bility of trading with an informed trader, reducing adverse selection costs 
and spreads.”
234
 A related study of the Toronto Stock Exchange argued 
that “stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and owner-
ship have a larger information asymmetry component of their bid-ask 
spread and wider bid-ask spread.”
235
 A different study analyzed stocks on 
Euronext Paris and concluded that “the adverse selection component of the 
spread is increasing with the ultimate and direct percentage of capital held 
by the main and the second shareholders, confirming that controlling 
shareholders are informed traders”
236
 and that “[t]he deviation between 
ultimate control and ownership increases the spread [and its adverse selec-
tion component].”
237
 
Providing a different perspective, one contribution analyzed the impact 
of the expiration of lockup provisions and found a decrease in bid-ask 
spreads for stocks on the NYSE and NASDAQ, which was primarily attri-
buted to a decline in the adverse selection component,
238
 thus “not 
find[ing] any support for the hypothesized adverse information effects of 
insider selling in the post-lockup expiration period.”
239
 A study of the 
HKSE also analyzed the expiration of lockup provisions, but it found 
wider bid-ask spreads for stocks and argued that this result “is likely to be 
caused by the potential sales by insiders and the risk for market makers to 
end up trading with better informed insiders.”
240
 An additional contribu-
tion suggested that announcements of losses or negative earnings changes 
are associated with a smaller decline in bid-ask spreads and larger adverse 
selection costs for stocks of firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
NASDAQ, as opposed to firms with positive earnings announcements.
241
 
                                                 
234 Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, Director Holdings, Shareholder Concen-
tration and Illiquidity 30–31 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=713181. 
235 Attig et al., supra note 81, at 2875. 
236 Edith Ginglinger & Jacques Hamon, Ownership, Control and Market Liquidity 23 
(May 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.fma 
.org/NY/Papers/ownershipliquidityFMANY.pdf. 
237 Id. at 16. 
238 Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti & Tiong Yang Thong, Lockup Expiration, Insider 
Selling and Bid-Ask Spreads, 17 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 230, 230, 234 (2008). 
239 Id. at 231. 
240 Marc Goergen et al., Price, Volume and Spread Effects Associated with the Expiry 
of Lock-In Agreements: Evidence from the Hong Kong IPO Market, 18 PAC.-BASIN FIN. 
J. 442, 458 (2010). 
241 Jeffrey Ng et al., Firm Performance Measures and Adverse Selection 25, 29–30 
(Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1324874. 
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Another study found that better scores for an index capturing various 
factors for individual firms, such as disclosure, corporate governance, and 
investor rights, are associated with smaller bid-ask spreads and the adverse 
selection component for stocks on the NYSE,
242
 but the impact of in-
formed trading—and, even more so, insider trading—was not isolated.
243
 
A different contribution, which focused on country-wide factors, analyzed 
ADRs traded on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ and argued that 
bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component are “positively corre-
lated with information opaqueness and poor protection of investor rights in 
the capital market environment of the home countries.”
244
 A similar study 
analyzed ADRs traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ and concluded that 
“ADRs of firms operating in good investor protection environments tend 
to have both lower information asymmetry costs and higher liquidity le-
vels [as measured by bid-ask spreads and market depths].”
245
 
Overall, studies addressing various firm characteristics that relate to 
information asymmetry and informed trading do not amount to a consis-
tent pattern, and conclusions of such studies often depend on the validity 
of the applicable bid-ask spread decomposition methodology. Further-
more, several studies that analyzed the connection between informed trad-
ing and market liquidity have causal factors that appear to be relatively 
remote,
246
 which also casts doubts on similar research. 
CONCLUSION 
 A balanced analysis of empirical studies and other evidence shows 
that the link between the impact of insider trading on market makers and 
market liquidity is quite weak in the context of many regulated and unre-
gulated securities markets. Market makers do not necessarily absorb the 
bulk of losses even if insider trading is viewed as a “zero-sum game” for 
                                                 
242 Chen et al., supra note 65, at 647, 657–58 & tbl.8. 
243 See id. at 649. 
244 Qiaoqiao Zhu, The Home Stigma: Adverse Selection in ADRs and the Home Capi-
tal Market Environment 26 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537502. 
245 Chung, supra note 81, at 1503. 
246 See, e.g., Boehmer et al. supra note 81 (the dual-class structure and the manage-
ment’s willingness to tie its personal wealth to firm performance); Maneeporn Gorkitti-
sunthorn et al., Insider Ownership, Bid-Ask Spread, and Stock Splits: Evidence from the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand, 15 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 450 (2006) (insider ownership 
in the context of stock splits); Gilles Hilary, Organized Labor and Informational Asym-
metry in the Financial Markets, 11 REV. ACCT. STUD. 525 (2006) (the strength of orga-
nized labor). 
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insiders and outsiders in a static framework.
247
 In fact, market makers are 
more concerned with certain types of short-term informed trading that has 
a direct impact on their losses and, hence, market liquidity. In many in-
stances, the adverse impact of insider trading on market makers may all 
but drown in the impact of overall order flow imbalances, inventory man-
agement, and short-term informed trading—without creating liquidity 
externalities in securities markets. 
One group clearly harmed by insider trading—with implications for li-
quidity of the applicable markets—consists of options market makers. 
While transactions on inside information in options may make the market 
for the underlying security more “efficient” via additional price-related 
signals, depending on the effectiveness of price discovery and its trans-
mission, and, consequently, more liquid, the decrease in liquidity of op-
tions markets may have adverse consequences for equity markets as well. 
Thus, these countervailing forces make social welfare calculations quite 
difficult. 
Overall, the current level of insider trading appears to have no signifi-
cant adverse effect on equity market makers, and any further tightening of 
insider trading regulation and additional enforcement is unlikely to in-
crease liquidity of equity markets. However, completely freeing the mod-
ern financial marketplace from regulatory restrictions on insider trading 
may present substantial problems for all types of market makers, but it is 
not a foregone conclusion. Although observing order flow that includes 
transactions based on inside information may still generate tangible bene-
fits for these market participants, the erosion of their institutional advan-
tages must be taken into account. 
Quite frequently, the existing empirical research on the link between 
informed trading and liquidity is used selectively to justify the necessity of 
insider trading regulation,
248
 and relevant conceptual, methodological, and 
measurement flaws and contradictions are largely ignored. Bid-ask spread 
decomposition studies are the Achilles’ heel of the efforts to use empirical 
research in support of insider trading regulation because of the uncertainty 
                                                 
247 For the “zero-sum game” paradigm in the context of insider trading formulated as 
the “Law of the Conservation of Securities,” see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARK I. 
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 3.3.5, at 55–58 (3d ed. 2010). For a more general “zero-
sum game” paradigm in the context of securities markets, see LARRY HARRIS, TRADING 
AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS (2003). 
248 See, e.g., Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Insid-
er Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 330 & n.214 (1994); Robert A. Prentice & Dale 
C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 66–67 & 
nn.302–05 (2010); A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice 
Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 50 & n.234 (1998). 
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regarding how “noisy” such results are and what exactly they measure. 
Even similar data sets and methodologies produce a wide range of esti-
mates of the cost of informed trading—frequently, without isolating the 
impact of insider trading as such—and, perhaps, in many cases, there is no 
unique “superior” methodology. Of course, these observations are not a 
general mistrust of advanced econometric techniques, but a call for an 
understanding of their limitations in public policy debates in order to 
avoid far-reaching conclusions based on very imprecise proxies. In fact, 
there is a need for further empirical research that would separate insider 
trading from other forms of informed trading and answer questions relat-
ing to such issues as the detection of insider trading activity by market 
makers and the use of inferred information, the impact of insider trading 
on inventory management by market makers, actual responses of market 
makers to perceived insider trading, the impact of insider trading in de-
rivatives on equity markets, and the effect of insider trading as such on 
volatility.
249
 In that respect, one necessary and difficult task consists of 
designing econometric proxies for the extent and impact of insider trading 
that are more reliable than the adverse selection component of bid-ask 
spreads or PIN estimates. 
Given the ambiguity of the existing evidence on the link between in-
sider trading and market liquidity—without an undue focus on outlier 
studies—it follows that the search for real economic costs of insider trad-
ing is not over. Perhaps the impact of insider trading on corporate gover-
nance, such as agency, incentives, and disclosure issues, is a more fruitful 
area for debating the desirability and the appropriate reach of regula-
tion.
250
 Another important question concerns the identity of “losers” in the 
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ble at http://bama.ua.edu/~aagrawal/IT.pdf; Steven Huddart & Henock Louis, Insider 
Selling, Earnings Management, and the 1990s Stock Market Bubble (Apr. 2011) (unpub-
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“zero-sum game” between insiders and outsiders. It is entirely possible 
that an increasing portion of trading losses from insider trading of outsid-
ers as a group is borne by high-frequency traders, given their growing 
importance,
251
 whether de facto market makers or not, because of the 
largely marginal nature of their transactions.
252
 Furthermore, the social 
utility of certain strategies employed by such traders has been repeatedly 
questioned—although this issue is controversial on both conceptual and 
empirical levels—by legislators, regulators, industry professionals, and 
researchers.
253
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